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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of two parts. In the first, I study a recent extension of the
maternity leave mandate for public sector employees. In the second, I focus on the gender
differential in housework hours and its evolution in the 2001-2009 period.
For the maternity leave part, identification relies on geographical and temporal variation
of the extensions. Data are drawn from the Annual Report on Social Information (RAIS)
and from the National Household Sample and from the National Household Sample Survey
(PNAD). There is some evidence of a modest, though statistically insignificant effect on
wages. This evidence is in tune with the international literature and lies within reasonable
bounds given by the expected increase in the employees’ costs. For fertility the results are
also similar to the literature, suggesting an increase. Nonetheless, those estimates are not
statistically significant. There is also some evidence of an increase in the attraction of the
public sector. In summary, results suggest that the extension did not have significant effects
on important labor market outcomes, such as wages. This might be indicative that the
distortions generated by the extension were not relevant.
The focus of the second part is on the gender differential in housework hours in Brazil
and its evolution. Data from 2001 and 2009 are drawn from the National Household Sample
Survey, which is representative of the Brazilian households. Results highlight that women
decreased their amount of housework in that period. Cohabiting or married men increased
slightly their amount of housework, whereas single men decreased their amount of housework.
According to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, the observable characteristics explain very
little of the gap in each year. Nonetheless, a substantial part the change in the gap can be
ii
attributed to changes in observable characteristics, mainly changes in the levels of economic
power, cohort and cohort-education interaction.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation encompasses two studies about the Brazilian economy. The first involves
assessing the effects of a recent extension of the maternity leave mandate for public sector
employees in Brazil. The second, studies gender differences in housework hours and their
evolution in the 2001-2009 period.
The importance of maternity leave has been emphasized by several organizations, includ-
ing the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Public Health Association, and the
Brazilian Pediatrics Association. Commonly cited reasons for supporting maternity leave
have been, inter alia, to foster and maintain labor force participation and to offer social
insurance to households at their prime childbearing age.
Several health associations are recommending the extension of the current leave length.1
Indeed, the recent literature stresses that the early part of a child’s life is an important
determinant of her well-being (Dustmann and Scho¨nberg, 2008).2
1In the U.S., e.g., the American Academy of Pediatrics is endorsing the concept of four months of
maternity leave, instead of the current 12 weeks.
2For papers studying the effects of parental leave or child care on child development, see inter alia, Baker
and Milligan (2008) and Berger, Hill, and Waldfogel (2005).
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Studying maternity leave is of special interest to Brazil, given that an extension of
parental leave is under the analysis of the Chamber of Deputies, after being approved by
the Federal Senate. Anticipating this legislation, since 2006 several Brazilian states have
approved similar pieces of legislation to public employees.
Motivated by these recent changes, the first part of this dissertation proposes to as-
sess the effects of this extension of the maternity leave length for state public employees.
Keeping in mind that the effects on the public sector might be different from the private
sector, addressing the Brazilian case is interesting for several reasons. First, the effects of
these policies on labor market outcomes are still not completely understood (Ruhm, 1998;
Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2007) and the existing evidence is mixed. Second, this is the first
time that an extension of maternity leave entitlements is brought in Brazil without any other
important labor market changes. This helps overcome one of the main difficulties in eval-
uating public policies, which is to disentangle the actual influence of a measure from other
contaminating effects. Furthermore, this extension was implemented at different points in
time by different states. These time and space dimensions will also help identify the actual
influence of extending the maternity leave for state employees. Third, the extension under
study was provided to state public sector employees. The consequences of maternity leave
provisions on the public sector labor market have not been the main focus of the empirical
literature. Nonetheless, a better understanding of the impacts on this sector should help
guide future policies concerning public employees and, possibly, lead to better spending of
public resources. Finally, Brazil has shorter leave entitlements than most of the European
Countries and Canada, but longer leave entitlements than the U.S. Given the evidence that
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the effect of maternity leave depends on the length of the leave (Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck,
2007), studying the Brazilian case would shed light on the effects on an intermediate case.
The second part of this dissertation looks at gender differences in housework hours in
Brazil and how those differences evolved from 2001 to 2009.
In the last decades, female labor market participation has increased substantially, but
women still do more housework than men. Indeed, among couples, women are responsible
for some two thirds of the housework (Alvarez and Miles, 2003).
Several countries have enacted legislation aiming at mitigating for females the double
burden of market and housework. Among the solutions taken are: subsidized childcare,
maternity leave provisions, responsible parenting policies, subsidies for durable market goods
and investment in education.
But given a fixed budget, which option (or combination of options) would be most effec-
tive? Even though this chapter does not give a final answer to this question, it provides a
first step to help design better policies in Brazil, by focusing on understanding the gap and
how it evolved in the 2001-2009 period.
To shed light on the gap itself, this dissertation will separate it into two parts. One that
captures the differences in housework hours that could be attributed to women and men
having different levels of observable characteristics, such as years of schooling. Another that
allows for those differences to arise because the relationship between those characteristics
and household hours might vary by gender.
A better understanding of the contribution of each of these components is important for
policy reasons. For instance, if it turns out that observable characteristics are the greatest
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responsible for the observed gap, focus on policies aiming at equalizing those characteristics
should help mitigate the gap. On the other hand, if the second source is the greatest con-
tributor, then the policies should target more in educational campaigns aiming at changing
how housework is perceived by each gender.
Studying the gender difference in housework hours in Brazil should also be valuable for
other countries for several reasons. First, the database used in this dissertation is of a larger
size than most of the existing papers in the literature and contains information on every
component of the household. Second, the literature on developing countries is relatively
scarce. Finally, to my knowledge, no work has tried to shed light on what have been the
main contributors to the evolution of the housework gap.
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Chapter 2
The effect of extending parental leave
on public sector employment
outcomes
2.1 Introduction
The participation of women - especially mothers of infants (Han et al., 2008) - in the
labor force has increased substantially in the last decades (Fullerton Jr, 1999; Jaumotte,
2003), whereas the probability of interrupting their career has decreased (Han, Ruhm, and
Waldfogel, 2009). This greater participation was accompanied in several countries by pieces
of legislation granting maternity leave. Indeed, as of 1991, more than 100 countries had some
legislation offering some form of paid maternity leave (Kamerman, 1991).
Despite being present in several countries, the effects of these policies on labor market
outcomes is still not completely understood (Ruhm, 1998; Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2007)
and the existing evidence is mixed (Ruhm, 1998).1
1For instance, cf., inter alia, Waldfogel (1997),Ruhm (1998) and Baum (2003b).
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Some of this ambiguity might stem from selection problems, as in the earlier studies that
had to rely on the effects of non-mandated leaves. Another part could be the consequence
of differences in the way leaves are designed:2 as Waldfogel (2001) notes, Nordic countries
typically have more generous leave policies, whereas England and U.S. are among the least
generous in terms of leave policies.
For some outcomes, these mixed empirical results could be expected, according to the
theory. For instance, for the relationship between extending the leave length and wages,
theory highlights two opposing forces. On one hand, search and hiring costs would be saved
and firm-specific capital would be preserved if the extension induced some of the women
who would otherwise quit to return to their pre-birth job. On the other hand, the lengthier
the leave, the greater is the deterioration of human-capital and the cost of the temporarily
vacant position. The final effect on wages would hinge on the strength of each of those forces.
In this first part of this dissertation, I assess the effects of an extension of the maternity
leave mandate, from 120 to 180 days, for public sector employees in Brazil using two datasets,
the Annual Report on Social Information and the National Household Sample Survey. In
particular, I focus on the effects on wages, fertility and turnover rate, but I also shed some
light on the effects of the extension on some characteristics of those who joined or left the
state public sector in Brazil.
The Brazilian literature on the effect of maternity leave is scarce. To my knowledge,
de Carvalho, Firpo, and Gonzaga (2006) is the sole paper that evaluates the effect of an
extension of maternity leave on labor market outcomes. They find no statistically significant
2For a summary of length and benefits for some OCDE countries, see Sleebos (2003, Figure 22, p.40).
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effect on wages or women’s retention in the labor market. Despite their contribution, the
maternity leave extension that they analyze was included in the 1988 Constitution, which
also brought several other changes to the Brazilian economy. Therefore, the measured effect
cannot be attributed solely to the extension of the leave.3
In comparison to the existing Brazilian literature, this dissertation will benefit from the
fact that this extension of maternity leave entitlements in Brazil was brought without any
other major change in the labor market and from the way it was implemented. In particular,
this extension was enacted by several Brazilian states at different points in time, creating
more variation to help identify the effect of extending the maternity leave than in the 1988’s
change.
This dissertation contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, by focusing on
the public sector. The consequences of maternity leave provisions on the public sector labor
market have been neglected by the empirical literature. Nonetheless, a better understanding
of the impacts on this sector should help guide the government’s future policies concerning
its employees. Second, there is a lack of studies focusing on developing countries, with most
papers studying Europe, Canada or the U.S. Third, Brazil has shorter leave entitlements
than most of the European Countries and Canada, but longer than the U.S. Given the
evidence that the effect of maternity leave depends on the length of the leave (Scho¨nberg
and Ludsteck, 2007), it should be of particular interest for the U.S. because it offers an
assessment of a closer scenario both in terms of population size and in terms of the leave
length than those other countries. Fourth, by looking at the effect on the decision to have a
3Unless those other changes have affected all the comparison groups in exactly the same way.
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child. According to World Bank Development Indicators, the Brazilian fertility rate has been
declining since the 60’s and is approaching European levels. Indeed, in 2009, the fertility
rate in Brazil was already lower than France. Even though recent studies e.g.,Lalive and
Zweimu¨ller (2009) and Bjo¨rklund (2006), have been confirming that maternity leave may
have a substantial positive impact on fertility rate,4 to the best of my knowledge, there is
no study analyzing this aspect using Brazilian data. Fifth, I test whether the extension
had heterogeneous effect on wages. This dimension has been scarcely explored in empirical
studies,5 but would be useful in designing maternity leaves. A better understanding of this
link would be of special importance to several countries, in particular to the U.S., where the
current leave entitlements do not cover many of the workers with a low level of education. If
this relationship between maternity leave and wages hinges on the amount of human capital,
one should be careful in using most of the existing literature to guide policies aimed at those
workers. Finally, I also test whether the extension had any effect on the turnover rate and
on other characteristics of female state employees in their prime childbearing ages.
2.2 Brazilian legislation on maternity leave: main facts
and the new reform
The Brazilian legislation on maternity leave has two milestones, the Consolidation of
Labor Laws in 1943 and the 1998 Constitution. The Consolidation of Labor Laws marks
4For a literature review, see Bjo¨rklund (2007).
5Han, Ruhm, and Waldfogel (2009) allow the effect of parental leave provisions on leave-taking, length of
leave and employment rates to vary with parental education. de Carvalho, Firpo, and Gonzaga (2006) also
allow for some heterogeneity, by estimating the effect on wages for four different levels of schooling.
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the first instance when the Brazilian government enacted legislation concerning maternity
leave.6 The 1988 Constitution extended the maternity leave from 84 to 120 days.
Nowadays, the government is proposing an extension of the paid maternity leave to 180
days. This extension was approved by the Federal Senate August 3, 2010 and is under
consideration by the Chamber of Deputies.7
Anticipating this piece of legislation, since 2006, several Brazilian states have been ap-
proving pieces of legislation extending paid maternity leave length from 120 to 180 days for
their own employees8 (state employees), as depicted in Table 2.1.
The main focus of those reforms was the maternity leave. Paternity leave in Brazil is
much shorter than maternity leave. For instance, the paternity leave for state employees
consists of at most 15 days.
2.3 Wage setting in the public sector
The wages of the state employees are typically renegotiated every year to compensate for
any inflation or other imbalance. The wage setting process involves the writing of a bill and
the subsequent approval of a committee.9
One cannot underestimate the importance of labor unions10 in this process. In fact, they
6Nonetheless, it was only in 1967 that this paid job-protected leave became compulsory. Initially, its costs
were bore by the employer. From 1974 onwards, the costs became the responsibility of the Brazilian Social
Welfare (National Social Security Institute, Ministry of Social Security).
7In the case of an approval it will be enacted, but if there are any suggested changes, the Federal Senate
will need to give its approval again.
8The Federal Government also enacted a law in 2008 extending the maternity leave to 180 days for its
own employees and offered the private firms a tax cut should they adopt this extension. For the private
firms, the legislation concerning tax cuts was enacted on December 23, 2009, being valid only after January
1, 2010.
9E.g., the state assembly.
10For more on labor unions in Brazil, see Arbache (2002).
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have a seat and a voice in the renegotiations, forming an important channel of communication
between employees and employers.11
For an individual employee, the wage might also vary for two reasons: seniority; or
promotion.12 In this dissertation, a control for seniority will be included, so most of the
variability will come either from general changes in the wage or from changes in the job
position due to demotions or promotions.
2.4 Expected effects of the extension
The extension of the maternity leave increases the costs to the government. Given higher
costs, one might argue that employers would have incentives to statistically discriminate
women in childbearing ages. Furthermore, leave usage might be taken as a signal of em-
ployee’s productivity level or even a signal of the employees’ preferences over her career. But
due to the non-discriminatory laws ruling the hiring process and the described wage setting
process - wages are set independent of gender, statistical discrimination, if any, might be
restricted mostly to changes in the job position of those women. On the other hand, the
extension also increases the attractiveness of the public sector. This could reflect in more
women applying for state positions and in a decrease in the turnover ratio of women in their
prime childbearing years.
Basing solely on the employer’s cost standpoint, an upper bound for the estimated effect
11Notice from Table 4.1, that the percentage of unionized people is higher in the public sector than in the
private sector. Nonetheless, the percentage of unionized young women (aged 20-40) is significantly smaller
than that of older women in the public sector. Hence, it might be expected that the higher participation of
the oldest would make pressure for the labor unions to spend more time lobbing for the interest of the elder
in negotiations.
12Notice that nominal wages might fall in the case of a demotion. Furthermore, a worker with higher
productivity might get seniority faster than other workers.
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of the leave extension on wages would be a 3% reduction. The reasoning behind this bound
is the following. The extra cost of two months granted by the extension would represent
2.17 out of the 13 wages received by the state employee per year, thus an increase of some
17% in the costs.13 Furthermore it would also cost 2 months of seniority, which should not
exceed 1%. Taking into account that the chance of a 20-40 year old woman having a child
should not be greater than 15%, 14 an upper bound for the impact on wages should be some
3%. 15
Concerning fertility, the extension of the maternity leave is expected to have a positive
impact.16 The main idea behind this effect is that the incentives given by the extension might
lead some women to increase their optimal number of children, by decreasing the cost of a
child.17 As the literature points out, the incentives given by the extension might also, in the
short-run, lead some women to reduce the spacing between pregnancies. Indeed, estimates
of the short-run effects on fertility tend to be greater than their long-run counterparts.
A reasonable impact on fertility is harder to estimate, since it hinges on individuals pref-
erences. The literature suggests significant effects of the extension on fertility; for instance,
Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) estimate, in the case of Austria, an increase of 15% in the
13The extension of 2 months would imply receiving 2 full wages plus 2/12 out of the 13th wage during the
leave.
14According to Table 4.1 some 9% of the women aged 20-40 in the public sector have a child aged 0-1.
The 95% upper bound for this estimate is some 9.5%. Milligan (2005) estimates an increase of up to 25%,
Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) finds estimates of an increase of up to 21%. Those increases would imply that
the probability of having a child would be at most some 12%. To be on the safe side, I will be using 15% as
an upper bound in the computation of cost.
15However, if there is avoidance of promoting females, then the effect on wage could vary further.
16Estimates of the impact of fiscal incentives on fertility tends to be sizable. For instance, Milligan (2005)
estimates that the effect of a tax incentive in Quebec on fertility was about 10%, being higher (up to 25%)
in families with more children.
17Some authors, e.g., Gauthier (2007), emphasize that parental leave policies might also influence fertility
by turning the leave itself more acceptable both socially and professionally.
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short-run.18
2.5 Empirical strategy
The main difficulty faced in evaluating any policy is how to disentangle its effect from those
of other concomitant changes. A na¨ıve estimator of the impact of the extension of the ma-
ternity leave would be to compare the outcomes for female state employees in their prime
childbearing age in states that have enacted the extension before and after this policy was
enacted. But this measurement would also be capturing other changes, such as macroeco-
nomic shocks. The idea behind the approach that I will use is to control for other potentially
unobserved effects by comparing the na¨ıve estimates for female public workers in states that
enacted the extension of the maternity leave with the na¨ıve estimates for female public
workers in the states that have not enacted the extension.19
More specifically, I will estimate the following difference-in-differences equation for public
sector women in their childbearing years:
Yist = α + β1 Xist + β2 γt + β3 µs + β4 maternity leave legislationst + ist (2.1)
where Yit is the outcome under analysis; maternity leave legislation takes value one when
the observation comes from a time and state where the extension of maternity leave is in
force; γt denotes time fixed effects; µs are state fixed effects; and X is a vector of other
controls.
18Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) find evidence of a persistent effect on fertility. For a review of the effects
of maternity leave on fertility, see Bjo¨rklund (2007).
19Notice that here the states have changed their laws at different points in time so, in fact, for each point
in time, the comparison goes between the states that have already enacted the extension against states that
have not - even if they are going to enact it in the near future.
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The key coefficient in the above equation is β4, which captures the effect of the extension
on the variables of interest, given the controls. β2 controls for time specific shocks and β3
for time-invariant discrepancies in states.
The assumption needed for identification is that the data for female state employees in
states that have not extended their maternity leaves provide information on what would have
happened to the female state employees in states that extended the maternity leave length if
the extension had not occurred.20 Therefore, any systematic difference between these groups
could be attributed to the extension of the leave length.
The core comparison in this paper is with women aged 20-40, nonetheless, there could
still be bias in the estimation proposed above, particularly, if there are trends specific to
the states that have enacted the extensions. In this vein, it would be advisable to have a
treatment and a control group within every state, so that any state-specific trend or other
state-specific shocks should cancel out. Three options would be to compare female state
employees in their prime childbearing years with male state employees in the same age-
group as them, with older female state employees, or with private-sector female employees
in their prime childbearing years.21
20More formally, the underlying assumption is that the unobserved difference in the counterfactuals of
treatment and control groups is time invariant.
21Notice that this kind of estimator is sensitive to the choice of comparison group
13
I will follow Gruber (1994) and Baum (2003b) and estimate: 22
Yist = α + β1Xist + β2 (Xist × TREATi) + β3 γt + β4 µs + β5 TREATi
+β6 (maternity leave legislationst) + β7 (TREATi × γt) + β8 (TREATi × µs)
+β9 (TREATi ×maternity leave legislationst) + ist (2.2)
where TREATi is is an indicator assuming value one for 20-40 female state employees. The
other variables are as defined bellow Equation 2.1.
In the equation above, β2 allows the characteristics controlled by X to have heteroge-
neous effects on the treatment group, β3 absorbs any year-specific shocks in the outcomes,
β4 controls for time-invariant discrepancies among states, β5 captures any time-invariant
discrepancies of the treatment group, β6 controls for state-specific time-specific effects that
are correlated with the extension, β7 captures year-specific effects that have influence only
over treatment group, β8 controls for time-invariant state-specific treatment-specific effects
and β9 is the coefficient of interest, i.e., the effect of the extension of the maternity leave on
the treatment group.
The identifying assumption of this triple difference approach is that the relative outcome
of the female state employees in non-treated states would mimic what would have happened
to the relative outcome of female state employees in treated states had the maternity leave
not been extended. Hence, any differences in the relative outcomes would be attributed to
22For the wages, one might argue the need for a selection correction, as in Van der Gaag and Vijverberg
(1988) and Adamchik and Bed (2000). There are two potential selections, first in the decision to work and
then in the decision to work in the public sector. Nonetheless, it should be recalled that in the absence of
a proper instrument and specification or non-normal errors, trying to correct for selection might lead to a
greater bias (Manski, 1989).
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the extension of the leave.
The previous estimations might not be free from bias if there are unobserved (at least by
the econometrician) individual heterogeneities. The reason would be that bias would arise
in the case those unobserved heterogeneities were correlated with the explanatory variables
in Xist. With this possibility in mind, in chapter 3, I will explore the panel structure of the
administrative database to allow the previous models to control for time-invariant unobserved
individual heterogeneities, by adding individual fixed effects.
Including the individual fixed effects, the difference-in-differences become: 23
Yist = αi + β1 Xist + β2 γt + β4 maternity leave legislationst + ist (2.3)
where αi controls for time-invariant individual heterogeneities. The other variables are
as defined in Equation 2.1.
Notice that the fixed-effect estimations already take time-fixed characteristics into ac-
count, therefore only time-varying individual characteristics are included as controls. Fi-
nally, notice that the presence of time-varying unobserved heterogeneity could still bias the
fixed-effect estimates.
2.6 Data
This dissertation uses two sources of data to analyze the impact of extending the maternity
leave length: the Annual Report on Social Information (RAIS); and the National Household
23This specification also alleviates one of the major drawback of RAIS, which is having a very limited
amount of information on the characteristics of the employees. As long as those characteristics do no change
over time, the fixed effect estimation will take care of their effect.
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Sample Survey (PNAD). The following subsections give a more detailed description of each
of these datasets.
2.6.1 RAIS data
The RAIS is an annual report mandatory24 for all companies in Brazil. This report, which
is collected by the Ministry of Labor and Employment, contains data on the employee level.
The main advantages of this database for studying the effect of maternity leave are its
coverage, which is estimated to be some 97% of the formal labor market in Brazil according
to the Brazilian Ministry of Labor and Employment,25 and its strucuture, which enables the
creation of a panel of workers. This panel structure will enable control for fixed unobserved
characteristics in the estimations. RAIS will also shed light on the turnover rate for the
public sector and on the characteristics of people who moved into and out of the public
sector.
The main drawback is that, given its scope, RAIS has a limited amount of employees’
characteristics. Furthermore, for this study, data from 2006 to 2010 is available with some
restrictions. For instance, information on the South region is incomplete. Therefore, when-
ever using RAIS data, this dissertation will only study the extensions that happened from
2007 onwards and will not include the states in the South, which limits the analyses to 21
of the 27 Brazilian states. This limitation is even greater for some variables, e.g., the reason
for being away from work is available only from 2007 onwards.
24In case of failing to fill a report, a company is subject to some form of penalty, which could vary from
a simple fine to the prohibition of its activities. In practice, according to Muendler (2008) those penalties
are rarely applied, but there are incentives to report, since some government funds are only provided to
companies that have submitted their annual report.
25 http://www.mte.gov.br/pdet/o_pdet/reg_admin/rais/apres_rais.asp accessed 05/10/2012.
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Omitting some states from the analysis might bring bias to the estimates. In order to
check the robustness of the results obtained using RAIS data, this dissertation will use the
PNAD database, which has data on all Brazilian states and enables estimations including a
longer pre-intervention period.
Before moving to the description of PNAD, it is important to comment on the expected
effects of omitting those states. First, note that extension of the maternity leave was the
same for both groups. Therefore, the expected increase in costs entailed by the extension
hinges on the computation of the probability of a person receiving the maternity leave benefit.
Hence, as a first approximation to the direction of the bias, I will take the standpoint of
the employer and compare the difference in these probabilities for two groups: the states
included in the analysis using RAIS; and the omitted states. Using PNAD data from26 2003-
2005, I find that the probability of having a child aged 0-1 among female state employees in
the omitted states is some 2.6% greater than that of the analyzed states. Therefore, point
estimates suggest that using RAIS results of the effect of extending the maternity leave on
wages of female state employees aged 20-40 would tend to underestimate the actual results.
Nonetheless the precision of those estimates does not allow ruling out that these averages
are equal or even that the average of the analyzed states is greater than that of the omitted
states.27
The direction of bias in the case of fertility is harder to estimate. First, notice that data
on leave taking is restricted to the 2007-2010 period, leading to a bigger set of states excluded
26I use pre-intervention averages in this computation since the extension itself might have changed these
probabilities.
27Results using Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney, two sample t-tests assuming equal variances and two-sample
t-tests allowing for different variances agree on the statistical insignificance of this difference.
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from the analysis than in the case of the effect on wages. Furthermore, the focus on lagged
effects limits the analysis even further. With those warnings in mind, there should be no bias
if decisions on fertility are based on comparing the costs and benefits of having an additional
child, since the same incentives were given to women in both groups of states.28 Nonetheless,
extending the maternity leave might also impact fertility by increasing the social and work
acceptance, therefore, the final effect on the direction of the bias of using restricted RAIS
data would hinge on differences in preferences between these two groups of state workers.
2.6.2 PNAD data
The PNAD is a cross-section representative of the Brazilian households that is conducted
annually29 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE).30 Its basic and
supplementary modules have a complex sample design, composed of three stages.31 In the
first stage, all municipalities in Brazil are divided into three groups: metropolitan areas,
auto-representative and non-auto-representative. The first two groups are automatically
included in the sample, whereas for the third group, which encompasses the majority of
the Brazilian municipalities, the inclusion is based on a sampling mechanism that attributes
28One could argue that same percentage change in opportunity costs would have different effects depending
on the level of wealth, as Gauthier (2007). But using PNAD data on female state employees’ wage as a proxy
for their wealth, there is no statistically significant difference between those groups in the 2003-2005 period.
Furthermore, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009) do not find differences in the fertility response with respect to
being a blue or white collar worker.
29Except in years where Census data are collected.
30It was only from 2004 onwards that the PNAD started including data on the rural areas of
Acre, Amapa´, Amazonas, Para´, Rondoˆnia and Roraima. For a brief summary of its history, see
http://www.metadados.ibge.gov.br/detalhePesquisa.aspx?cod=PD
31PNAD has three modules: Basic, Supplementary and Special. The basic module aims at providing the
main socio-economic characteristics of the Brazilian Population. The supplements enable a deeper focus on
some of the themes covered by the basic module as well as on additional topics, e.g., PNAD was accompanied
with a Health Supplement in 2003 and 2008. The special modules are designed to deal with more complex
themes, which might need distinct sampling designs.
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to each municipality a probability of being drawn proportional to its population in the
previous census. In the second stage, smaller regions, known as census sectors, are chosen
using probability proportional to their population. In the last stage,32 households are chosen
based on a simple systematic sampling. Once a household is interviewed, it is no longer
eligible to be drawn until the next census, so no household is surveyed more than once
between any two censuses.
This complex design creates dependence among sample observations, which leads to
biased standard errors if a simple random sampling is assumed in the estimation of the
variance-covariance matrix. A natural solution would be to cluster the results by stratum.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the coefficient of interest in equation 2.1,β4 , does
not vary within state. Furthermore, the outcomes of interest are expected to be autocor-
related. Therefore, I will follow Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and use block
bootstrap in the level of States. Notice, however, that this approach might be too conserva-
tive and that the number of states in Brazil is barely half of the number of states in the U.S.
As Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004, p.266) point out, this method suffers when the
number of groups is reduced.33
This dissertation will use PNAD data from 2003 until 2009. This widest time span will
benefit the analysis by allowing for a larger pre-intervention period than that of RAIS. By
being representative of the Brazilian households, the results from PNAD will allow checking
the robustness of those from RAIS. Furthermore, the design of PNAD, which includes several
32Both the first and second stages are conducted only once between censuses. For the third stage, in every
year the list of possible surveyed households is updated.
33For instance, the power of the test for a true 2 % effect was only 19% when the number of observations
equaled 20 in their Monte Carlo simulations.
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socio-economic variables, allows a richer set of controls than in RAIS. Concerning fertility,
PNAD has information on the total amount of children and their characteristics. Hence,
with PNAD it is possible to assess whether the extension of maternity leave length had an
impact on having older children, which could be a sign that either women with older kids
are more attracted to join the state public sector or those who already were in the public
sector would be less inclined to leave their jobs after the extension.
Nonetheless, PNAD is not free of shortcomings. First, different households are sampled
every year, so it is not possible to control for fixed unobserved characteristics. If those exist
and are correlated with the outcome under analysis, bias is expected to arise. Second, due
to its main goal and to survey costs, the sample from PNAD is of a much smaller size than
that of RAIS, contributing to inflating the standard deviation of the estimates.
2.7 Tables
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Table 2.1: Dates at which each state extended its maternal leave.
State Law Number Date
Amapa´ 1, 003 June 06
Rondoˆnia 46 December 06
Para´ıba 22 December 06
Ceara´ 13, 881 April 07
Piau´ı 84 May 07
Pernambuco 91 June 07
Rio Grande do Norte 8, 995 August 07
Esp´ırito Santo 418 November 07
Alagoas 34 December 07
Sa˜o Paulo 1, 054 July 08
Mato Grosso 330 September 08
Tocantins 1, 981 November 08
Sergipe 161 November 08
Distrito Federal 790 December 08
Rio Grande do Sul 13, 117 June 09
Roraima 22 March 09
Para´ 7, 267 May 09
Rio de Janeiro 128 June 09
Santa Catarina 447 July 09
Parana´ 16, 176 July 09
Goia´s 16, 677 August 09
Amazonas 55 March 10
Mato Grosso do Sul 3, 855 March 10
Minas Gerais 18, 879 May 10
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the legislation of each state.
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Chapter 3
Empirical results from panel data,
RAIS
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Before presenting empirical results from RAIS data, in Table 3.1, I report some descriptive
statistics of the main variables. The first column presents figures for state employees aged
20-40. Men are the majority among 20-40 state employees. The mean age of this group is
around 33 years and the mean seniority is some 88 months. The majority of state employees
aged 20-40 have completed at least high school, some 37% have a college degree. The other
columns of Table 3.1 disaggregate the information in the first column and include females
20-40 from the private sector and female state employees aged 41-65. Women, on average,
receive lower wages than men. Female state employees aged 20-40, tend to have a higher
level of schooling than the other groups. Among women in the 20-40 group, state employees
are on average older and tend to have a higher seniority than those in the private sector.
For instance, almost half of the female state employees aged 20-40 have a college degree.
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To shed light on the panel structure, the number of observations per state employee aged
20-40 in RAIS is presented in Table 3.2. The first column suggests that some 47% of the
individuals are present in every year of this analysis whereas some 91% appear at least twice.
The last column restricts the analysis to female state employees aged 20-40. The percentage
present in every year decreases to some 41% and the percentage of individuals appearing at
least twice decreases to some 89%.
Identification in fixed-effect models relies on those individuals who are present at least
twice, therefore, in order to make those models comparable with non-fixed-effects ones, the
difference-in-differences estimates will exclude individuals that are present only once in the
database.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Effects on wages
In this subsection, the effect of extending the maternity leave length on wages of female
state employees aged 20-40 is assessed using difference-in-differences and triple differences
approaches. Even though the RAIS database enables controlling for individual unobserved
characteristics, models excluding those controls will also be presented. To make those models
comparable, data will be restricted to those individuals who are present at least twice in the
dataset whenever fixed effect estimations are also presented, given that identification from
fixed-effect models relies solely on those individuals.
Table 3.3 presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the maternity leave
extension on the wages of female state employees aged 20-40. In the first columns, Equa-
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tion 2.1 is used without any covariates in the X term. In the last columns, I include the
following controls: second-order polynomials for age and job tenure (seniority); and dummies
for levels of schooling.
For both models, the results suggest a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect, of
some 4%, on the wages.1 These results are in tune with the empirical literature, which
usually estimates either not significant or negative effects on wages.
Notice that these point estimates are higher than the upper bound given by the expected
increase in the costs of the employers, but some comments are important. First, estimates
are not statistically significant, so a positive effect cannot be ruled out either. Second, the
presence of unobserved characteristics could be biasing these estimates.
With this last warning in mind, in Table 3.4, I show estimates from models that control
for potential time-invariant unobserved characteristics, by exploring the panel structure of
the RAIS. The first two models include fixed effects to the models shown in the previous
table.2 The third model is a random effect version of model (2). The last model is the
random effect version of the second model in Table 3.3.
The results suggest that even after the inclusion of the control for time-invariant unob-
served characteristics, the estimated effect on wage is negative and statistically insignificant.
Nonetheless, controlling for those unobserved characteristics suggests a smaller effect of the
extension on the wages of female state employees aged 20-40: a decrease of some 0.5%, which
lies within the boundaries discussed in chapter 2. In fact, if the fixed effect estimations are
1Including all observations instead of focusing solely on the individuals who appear at least twice does
not change the main picture (results not shown).
2And remove any time-invariant covariates in the fixed effects estimator, which will be captured by the
fixed effects.
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taken as the favorite models, then the precision of the estimates enables excluding any wage
decrease of more than 3%, at a 5% significance level.
Still other possible trends might be biasing these results. To complement the previous
findings and control for those trends, I also compute triple difference estimates of the effect
of the maternity leave extension on wages of female state employees aged 20-40.
Table 3.5 shows that, independent of the control group, the results from triple differ-
ences are in tune with difference-in-differences findings: the estimates suggest a negative,
but statistically insignificant, effect on wages. The inclusion of controls for potential time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneities does not change the main picture, as reported in Table
3.6. In general the effect on wages is still negative, though closer to zero, and statistically
insignificant.3
To sum up, all models suggest a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect of the
maternity leave extension on the wages of female state employees aged 20-40. The estimated
effect lies within a reasonable range given by the increase in costs to the employer.
Overall wages might change because of the existing workers’ wages change or because the
wages for new-hires change. In order to shed some light on those movements, I will report
difference-in-differences estimates that include only new-hires (two last columns of Table 3.7)
and difference-in-differences estimates that include only those who appeared in the dataset
during the whole period of analysis (two first columns of Table 3.7).
Once again all estimates are statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, there are at least two
conclusions to be drawn from Table 3.7. First that the results from Table 3.3 are robust to
3The fact that estimates are closer to zero might be a result of the well-known attenuation bias, which is
exacerbated in fixed-effects estimations.
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restricting the sample to those who are present in all periods of analysis. Second that the
observed change in wages should not be stemming from the wages for the new-hires.
3.2.2 Effects on the turnover rate
The increase in the maternity leave length, coeteris paribus, is expected to increase the
attractiveness of the public sector to the females in their prime childbearing years. This
could reflect in a lower turnover rate for those employees.
Table 3.8 assesses whether there was any effect of the extension on the turnover rate
for female state employees aged 20-30. The first columns present estimates of a difference-
in-differences approach. The last columns report triple differences estimates that use male
state employees aged 20-30 as a control.
Results from difference-in-difference suggest a statistically insignificant decrease in the
turnover rate of some 2 percentage points. Allowing for weaker assumptions, by estimating
triple differences, does not change the main picture. The sole difference is that estimates are
closer to zero, indicating that part of the decrease in the turnover rate was to be expected
even without the extension. Estimates from triple differences suggest a 1.2 percentage point
decrease in the turnover rate, which corresponds to some 13% decrease in the turnover of
20-30 public sector females.
Those estimates of a decrease in the turnover rate, despite being statistically insignificant,
are in tune with the assumption that the extension of maternity leave would increase the
attractiveness of the state public sector to women in their prime childbearing years.
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3.2.3 Lagged effects on the probability of taking a maternity leave
The extension is expected to increase the probability of taking a maternity leave. As men-
tioned before, this increase in the short-run should overstate the long-run effect in the case
where some women find it optimal to reduce the spacing between the births of their children.
Table 3.9 shows no statistically significant evidence of an effect of the extension on the
probability of female state employees aged 20-30 taking a maternity leave. The first model
estimates Equation 2.1 without any covariates in the Xist term. The second model includes
dummies for levels of schooling and quadratic terms for age and seniority. Both models
estimate a statistically insignificant increase of some 0.3 percentage points, which would
correspond to an increase of some 17% in the probability of taking a maternity leave.
Table 3.10 highlights that there is still no evidence of a statistically significant effect on
the probability of taking a maternity leave, even after controlling for fixed unobserved het-
erogeneity. Nonetheless, point estimates do not differ too much from the previous estimates.
For instance, for model (1) and (2), the estimates are of an increase of some 17% and 13%,
respectively.
3.2.4 Characteristics of those who joined and of those who left
the state public sector
Finally, I will focus on the characteristics of people aged 20-30 who joined or left the state
public sector and check whether those characteristics were influenced by the extension of the
maternity leave length. For each year, the subsample used in the analyses will include only
those who joined (left) the public sector.
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Table 3.11 shows estimates of the effect on those who joined the public sector. The
first column presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the extension on
the percentage of females among 20-30 people entering the state public sector. The point
estimates suggest an increase in this percentage, which corroborates the idea of public sector
more attractive to women in their prime childbearing age. Nonetheless, the point estimate
is close to zero and statistically insignificant.
The other columns of Table 3.11 assess, for those 20-30 females who joined the public
sector, whether there was any change in their age at entrance or in the probability of them
holding at least a college degree.
For age at entrance, the difference-in-differences estimate indicates a statistically signif-
icant decrease. This result is in tune with the idea that the youngest are the group that
would benefit most from this policy. Nonetheless, when men are used as a control group
in the triple differences, the point estimate is closer to zero and statistically insignificant,
suggesting that part of this decrease in the age at entrance was expected even in the absence
of the law.
For the probability of holding at least a college degree at entrance in the state public
sector, estimates suggest no statistically significant change. Difference-in-differences esti-
mates indicate a decrease of some 0.4 percentage points, whereas triple differences suggest a
decrease of some 5.3 percentage points.4 Triple-differences indicate that an increase on the
probability of holding at least a college degree at entrance was expected without the exten-
sion. Once this increase is taken into account, the effect of the extension becomes stronger,
4Recall that for triple-differences, the coefficient of interest is “Eligible for treatment × maternity leave
legislation”.
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though not statistically significant. This negative effect could be signaling that the extension
of the maternity leave length was less attractive to women with higher levels of education
than to those with lower levels. The precision of the estimates does not allow ruling out
economically important effects on this variable.
Table 3.12 shows results analogous to the previous table, but focusing on the group of
people aged 20-30 who left the state public sector. The table also includes the analysis of
the effect of the extension on the natural logarithm of seniority.
There is no evidence that the extension had any effect on the percentage of 20-30 women
exiting the public sector. Indeed, estimates are close to zero and statistically insignificant.
Difference-in-differences estimates suggest a positive effect on age at exit but, as in the
case of age at entry, triple differences weakens the size and the statistical significance of the
effect. The decrease in the entrance age (Table 3.11) and the increase in exit age (Table 3.12),
despite not being economically significant, are consistent with the idea that the maternity
leave extension increased the attractiveness of the state public sector for women in their
prime childbearing years.
Regarding the probability of holding at least a college degree at exit, triple differences
suggest no statistically significant effects of the extension. The point estimate of a increase
of some 1.1 percentage point, nonetheless, could, as in the analogous case of this probability
at entry, be signaling a greater attractiveness of the public sector to women with lower levels
of education than to those with higher levels.
As in the case of age at exit, the point estimates of the effect of the extension on the
seniority at exit is consistent with the idea of an increase in the attractiveness of the public
29
sector for women aged 20-30. Triple differences suggest a 4% increase in seniority at exit,
but this effect is not statistically significant.
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3.3 Figures and tables
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Table 3.2: Number of observations per person for state public employees aged 20-40, 2006-
2010
Number of observations All Female
1 454, 616 262, 682
2 588, 052 312, 017
3 709, 200 361, 718
4 855, 816 447, 633
5 2, 260, 765 956, 659
Total 4, 868, 449 2, 340, 709
Source: Author’s tabulation using the RAIS from 2006 until 2010.
Table 3.3: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of extending the maternity leave
length on wages of female state employees aged 20-40
(1) a (2) b
Maternity leave legislation −0.035 (0.029) −0.043 (0.030)
Year
2007 0.019 (0.024) 0.019 (0.024)
2008 0.058? (0.029) 0.068?? (0.025)
2009 0.111?? (0.040) 0.120??? (0.041)
2010 0.204??? (0.044) 0.179??? (0.044)
Constant 3.814??? (0.018) 1.948??? (0.410)
Personal characteristics No Yes
R2 0.09 0.26
N 2,078,027 2,078,027
Source: Author’s estimations using the RAIS from 2006 until 2010.
The table does not include states from the South Region nor Roraima, Para´ıba or Amapa´.
Robust standard errors clustered by State, in parentheses.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
Sample restricted to those individuals present at least twice in the dataset.
a Model (1) is Equation 2.1 without the X term.
b Model (2) adds to Model (1): dummies for levels of schooling; and quadratic terms
for age and seniority.
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Table 3.4: Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of extending the maternity leave
length on wages of female state employees aged 20-40, with controls for time-invariant unob-
served individual heterogeneity
(1) Fixed Effects a (2) Fixed Effects b (3) Random Effects c (4) Random Effects d
Maternity leave legislation −0.004 (0.015) −0.005 (0.015) −0.005 (0.015) −0.007 (0.014)
Year
2007 0.062??? (0.012) 0.066??? (0.012) 0.039??? (0.013) 0.032?? (0.013)
2008 0.130??? (0.016) 0.138??? (0.014) 0.082??? (0.018) 0.073??? (0.020)
2009 0.219??? (0.017) 0.233??? (0.024) 0.145??? (0.019) 0.132??? (0.020)
2010 0.308??? (0.021) 0.325??? (0.025) 0.206??? (0.028) 0.191??? (0.031)
Constant 3.737??? (0.010) 2.230??? (0.322) 1.549??? (0.431) 3.181??? (0.068)
Personal characteristics No Yes Yes Yes
N 2,078,027 2,078,027 2,078,027 2,078,027
Source: Author’s estimations using the RAIS from 2006 until 2010.
Robust standard errors clustered by State, in parentheses.
The table does not include states from the South Region nor Roraima, Para´ıba or Amapa´.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
Sample restricted to those individuals present at least twice in the dataset.
a Model (1) is Equation 2.1 without the X term; controls for fixed effects.
b Model (2) adds to Model (1): quadratic terms for age and seniority; and controls for fixed effects.
c Model (3) similar to (2), but using random effects instead of fixed effects.
d Model (4) similar to (2) of the previous table, but includes random effects for the estimations.
Table 3.5: Triple differences estimates of the effect of extending the maternity leave length
on the natural logarithm of hourly wages of 20-40 female state employees
Public Sector Private Sector
Control: Men aged 20-40 a Control: Women aged 41-65 b Control: Women aged 20-40 c
Eligible for treatment × maternity leave legislation −0.011 (0.019) −0.011 (0.017) −0.035 (0.029)
Maternity leave legislation −0.032 (0.027) −0.033 (0.029) −0.006? (0.003)
Eligible for treatment −0.761?? (0.340) −1.367??? (0.395) −0.355 (0.359)
Constant 2.709??? (0.195) 3.274??? (0.124) 2.230??? (0.077)
R2 0.28 0.33 0.50
N 4,413,833 6,249,549 2.64e+07
Source: Author’s own estimations using the RAIS from 2006 until 2010. Robust standard errors clustered by State, in parentheses.
The table does not include states from the South Region nor Roraima, Para´ıba or Amapa´.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
Data restricted to those individuals present at least twice in the dataset.
a This model uses men aged 20-40 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X variables as in Model (2) of Table 3.3.
b This model uses women aged 41-65 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X variables as in Model (2) of Table
3.3.
c This model uses private sector female employees aged 20-40 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X variables
as in Model (2) of Table 3.3.
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Table 3.6: Triple differences estimates of the effect of extending the maternity leave length
on the natural logarithm of hourly wages of 20-40 female state employees, controlling for fixed
effects
Public Sector Private Sector
Control: Men aged 20-40 a Control: Women aged 41-65 b Control: Women aged 20-40 c
Eligible for treatment × maternity leave legislation −0.009 (0.015) −0.005 (0.014) −0.024 (0.014)
Maternity leave legislation 0.004 (0.015) −0.000 (0.018) 0.007?? (0.003)
Eligible for treatment 0.261 (0.377) −0.831? (0.438) −0.067 (0.453)
Constant 2.100??? (0.277) 2.705??? (0.219) 1.959??? (0.075)
N 4,413,833 6,249,549 2.64e+07
Source: Author’s own estimations using the RAIS from 2006 until 2010. Robust standard errors clustered by State, in parentheses.
The table does not include states from the South Region nor Roraima, Para´ıba or Amapa´.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
Sample restricted to those individuals present at least twice in the dataset.
a This model uses men aged 20-40 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X variables as in Model (1) of Table 3.4.
b This model uses women aged 41-65 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X variables as in Model (2) of Table
3.4.
c This model uses private sector female employees aged 20-40 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X variables
as in Model (2) of Table 3.4.
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Table 3.8: Difference-in-differences and triple differences estimates of the effect of extending
the maternity leave length on the turnover rate of 20-30 female state employees
Difference-in-Differencesa Triple Differences b
Eligible for treatment × maternity leave legislation −0.012 (0.046)
Maternity leave legislation −0.020 (0.041) −0.008 (0.033)
Eligible for treatment −0.001 (0.068)
Year
2007 −0.010 (0.036) −0.009 (0.030)
2008 0.023 (0.039) 0.005 (0.032)
2009 0.080? (0.046) 0.032 (0.037)
2010 0.068 (0.050) 0.028 (0.040)
Constant 0.095 (0.059) 0.096?? (0.048)
Personal characteristics No Yes
R2 0.58 0.58
N 105 210
Source: Author’s estimations using the RAIS from 2006 until 2010.
The table does not include states from the South Region nor Roraima, Para´ıba or Amapa´.
Robust standard errors clustered by State, in parentheses.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
a Model (1) estimates Equation 2.1 aggregating observations by state.
b Model (2) estimates Equation 2.2 using male states employees aged 20-30 as the control group and
aggregating observations by state.
Table 3.9: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of extending the maternity leave
length on the probability of taking a maternity leave, female state employees aged 20-30
(1) a (2) b
Maternity leave legislation 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
Year
2008 0.004 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002)
2009 0.004 (0.003) 0.003 (0.002)
2010 0.009?? (0.004) 0.005 (0.003)
Constant 0.001 (0.002) 0.034 (0.045)
Personal characteristics No Yes
R2 0.04 0.04
N 486,100 486,100
Source: Author’s estimations using the RAIS from 2007 until 2010.
The table does not include states from the South Region nor Roraima,
Para´ıba, Amapa´, Ceara´, Pernambuco, Piau´ı or Rio Grande do Norte.
Robust standard errors clustered by State, in parentheses.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
Sample restricted to those individuals present at least twice in the dataset.
a Model (1) is Equation 2.1 without the X term.
b Model (2) adds to Model (1): dummies for levels of schooling; and
quadratic terms for age and seniority.
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Table 3.10: Difference-in-Differences estimates of the effect of extending the maternity leave
length on the probability of taking a maternity leave among female state employees aged 20-30,
with controls for time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity
(1) Fixed Effects a (2) Fixed Effects b (3) Random Effects c (4) Random Effects d
Maternity leave legislation 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.004) 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
Year
2008 0.005 (0.003) 0.007 (0.004) 0.004 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002)
2009 0.009? (0.005) 0.014? (0.007) 0.005? (0.003) 0.003 (0.002)
2010 0.015?? (0.007) 0.022?? (0.009) 0.009?? (0.004) 0.005 (0.003)
Constant 0.008?? (0.003) 0.166?? (0.070) 0.000 (0.002) 0.038 (0.044)
Personal characteristics No Yes No Yes
N 486,100 486,100 486,100 486,100
Source: Author’s estimations using the RAIS from 2007 until 2010.
The table does not include states from the South Region nor Roraima,
Para´ıba, Amapa´, Ceara´, Pernambuco, Piau´ı or Rio Grande do Norte.
Robust standard errors clustered by State, in parentheses.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
Sample restricted to those individuals present at least twice in the dataset.
a Model (1) is Equation 2.1 without the X term; controls for fixed effects.
b Model (2) adds to Model (1): dummies for levels of schooling; quadratic terms for age and seniority; and controls
for fixed effects.
c Model (3) similar to (1), but using random effects instead of fixed effects.
d Model (4) similar to (2), but includes random effects for the estimations.
Table 3.11: Estimates of the impact of extending the maternity leave length on the charac-
teristics of employees aged 20-30 joining the public sector
Difference-in-Differences Triple differences
Female Age College or more Age College or more
Eligible for treatment × maternity leave legislation −0.050 −0.053
(0.054) (0.035)
Maternity leave legislation 0.003 −0.177?? −0.004 −0.127? 0.049
(0.020) (0.075) (0.060) (0.073) (0.039)
Eligible for treatment 0.341??? 0.182???
(0.071) (0.037)
Constant 0.591??? 25.749??? 0.589??? 25.407??? 0.407???
(0.013) (0.038) (0.033) (0.065) (0.013)
N 430,132 231,425 231,425 430,132 430,132
Source: Author’s tabulation using the RAIS from 2006 until 2009. Standard errors in parentheses.
The control group used in the triple differences is males aged 20-30.
College or more is a dummy indicating that the person holds at least a college degree.
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Chapter 4
Empirical results from repeated
cross-sections, PNAD
4.1 Descriptive statistics
The main variables for the state public employees are described in the first column of
Table 4.1. Females are the majority among state employees, so are white and cohabiting or
married people. The mean education is some 12 years, which is close to the mean seniority.1
Most of the state employees are under the statutory regime, do not work during night shifts
and are not affiliated with any union.2 Lastly, an important variable reported in the table
is ‘Maternity leave legislation’, which is a dummy variable that assumes value one if the
observation belongs to a state that has extended its maternity leave at a time that the
extension is in effect. Some 19% of the data fall into this category. The other columns of
Table 4.1 disaggregate the basic statistics into subgroups and include females 20-40 from
1The median years of study is 13, which is close to the median seniority 11.
2Affiliation to union is not compulsory in Brazil. Inside each state there are several public institutions,
each public institution might have its own union. In some cases, there are several labor unions for the same
institution.
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the private sector in the comparison. The second column describes the treatment group,
women aged 20-40. The others give information about the three control groups: male state
employees aged 20-40, female state employees aged 41-65, and female private employees aged
20-40. Women, on average, receive lower wages than men. Nonetheless, treated women have
more years of study than the control groups. Finally, older women (aged 41-65) are more
prone to be affiliated with a union.
Finally, Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of 20-40 years-old female state employees over
the 2003-2009 period does not differ significantly between states that have and states that
have not extended the maternity leave for their employees. The dashed blue line depicts
the percentage of female state employees in states that have extended their maternity leave,
whereas the red line indicates the percentage in states that have not extended the leave. The
dotted blue lines indicate the 95% confidence interval for the percentage in states that have
extended.3
4.2 Results
Before going into the analyses of the results, it is important to show how the main
outcomes have evolved, especially, how they behaved before and after the extension.
3To formally test the conclusion, I checked whether there was any effect on the percentage of female in
the public sector. Results cannot reject that there was no effect. In particular, the difference-in-differences
do not reject that there was no change in the percentage of female between states that have and have not
extended the maternity leave. Furthermore, the following triple differences captured no effect: comparing
percentage of women with 20-40 years of age with the percentage of women with 41-65 across states that
have and have not extended the maternity leave; comparing the percentage of female state employees aged
20-40 with the percentage of private sector female employees aged 20-40 across states that have and have
not extended the maternity leave.
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Figure 4.2 depicts the evolution of the natural logarithm of real hourly wages. Since
the extensions occurred at different points in time, I normalize to zero the date at which
the maternity leave was extended. Figure 4.2 presents no clear evidence of an effect of the
extension. Indeed, it suggests an upward trend in natural logarithm of real hourly wages of
all groups before the extension and a reversal of this trend after the extension. Nonetheless,
it is interesting to notice that for men aged 20-40 (blue line), which should be the group
that would be competing for promotions more closely to women aged 20-40 (red line), the
reversal of the trend was weaker than for the other groups.
Figure 4.3 compares the evolution of the probability of having a child aged 0-1 for 20-30
female state public sector employees (red line) with 20-30 female private sector employees
(blue dashed line). Once again, there is no clear evidence of an effect of the extension.
4.2.1 Effect on wages
The estimates of the differences-in-differences, presented in Table 4.2, give some evidence
that the extension of maternity leave led to a decrease in the real hourly wages for the women
of childbearing age. The first columns report estimates of Equation 2.1 using the natural
logarithm of the real hourly wage as a dependent variable and without any covariates in
the Xist term of that equation. Including individual characteristics is what increases the
explanatory power most among the reported regressions (Model (2)). Model (3) includes
work contract controls, state unemployment rate, a dummy for being affiliated to a labor
union and a quadratic term on seniority. Once these characteristics are taken into account,
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the relationship between the extension and wages is shown to be statistically insignificant.
Model (4) controls for the work activity. Models (5) and (6) allow for trends. In (5), a
common trend is assumed for all states, whereas in (6) there is a trend for each state. The
size of the coefficient is relatively stable over those different estimations, as Table 4.2 reports.
In particular, model (4) suggests that the wages reduced some 3 % after the extension of
the maternity leave length. In general, notice that even for the models where there is no
statistically significant effect, economically significant effects cannot be ruled out.
The effect on the real hourly wages becomes weaker and statistically insignificant when
using the triple difference design Table 4.3. Nonetheless, I still cannot reject economically
significant effects of the extension, given the precision of the estimates. For instance, the 95%
confidence interval for the effect of the extension on the natural logarithm of the real hourly
wages is [-0.094,0.037], using men 20-40 years old as the control group, [-0.041,0.033], using
women 41-65 years old, and [-0.067, 0.032] using 20-40 private sector female employees as
the control group. Therefore, the decrease obtained in the difference-in-difference approach
cannot be ruled out by the triple differences, independent of the control group. Finally,
as suggested by the graphical analysis, when men aged 20-40 are used as the comparison
group, the point estimates of the impact of the extension on the natural logarithm of the
hourly wages are higher. This corroborates the idea of an adjustment of wages through
promotions/demotions. Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that those point estimates
are not statistically significant.
It could be expected that a higher level of human-capital should be related to a higher
level of capital depreciation (Anderson, Binder, and Krause, 2002), hence an increase in the
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maternity leave length would, coeteris paribus, be more costly to the firm the higher the
human capital of the worker. But theory also highlights the importance of search and hiring
costs, which also should be positive related to human capital. The net effect of these costs
determines the relationship between human-capital and extension of the maternity leave
length. For instance, as long as the costs of hiring do not differ too much by the human-
capital, the extension would lead to a reduction of the wages of workers with high level of
human-capital. I have estimated both the difference-in-difference and triple difference models
allowing for an interaction with years of study. As presented in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, in
none of the specifications was there a statistically significant heterogeneous effect.
4.2.2 Lagged effect on the probability of having a child aged 0-1,
aged 2-5 and aged 6-10.
In this subsection, I allow for the extension of the maternity leave to have a lagged effect
on the probability of having a child aged 0-1, a child aged 2-5 and a child aged 6-10. Unless
public servants had prior knowledge of the change in the law, there should not be a strong
effect on the probability of having a child aged 0-1 in the first year given the lag between
the decision of having a child and birth.
Table 4.6 shows the difference-in-differences estimates of the (lagged) effect of extending
the maternity leave length on the probability of having a child aged one or less for 20-30
year-old female state employees. In general, the effect was of an increase of some 1 percentage
point, which would correspond to a increase of some 11%, but it is not statistically significant.
44
Triple differences estimates, presented in Table 4.7 also suggest a positive impact, but still
statistically insignificant.
PNAD data also enables estimating the effect on the probability of having a child aged
2-5 and 6-10. Concerning the probability of having a child aged 2-5, both the difference-
in-differences, Table 4.8, and triple difference, Table 4.9, results suggest a economically and
statistically insignificant effect of the extension. For the probability of having a child aged 6-
10, the effects are stronger but still statistically insignificant, as presented in Tables 4.10 and
4.11. These last results might be indicative of people that already had kids being attracted to
the public sector after the extension, or, analogously, people who already had kids becoming
less prone to leave the public sector.
4.2.3 Falsification tests for the triple difference
To probe the triple difference design, I will evaluate the presence of hidden biases by
following an approach suggested by Rosenbaum (2002). The main idea is to apply the
triple difference to variables that are not expected to be influenced by the extension of the
maternity leave.
In this vein, I estimate the effect of the extension on the probability of receiving a meal
ticket using a linear probability model. There is no requirement for an employer to give meal
tickets to its employees in Brazil. In particular, whether a State does or does not give meal
tickets to some of its employees should have no relation with the extension of the maternity
leave length.
45
Table 4.12 confirms that there was no statistically significant evidence that the extension
had any effect on this outcome, independent of the comparison group and of the inclusion
of the interaction with years of study. This result does not prove that there are no hidden
biases, but gives more assurance to the identification strategy.4
4.3 Figures and tables
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics, 2003-2009
Public Sector Private Sector
All, 20-65 years old Women, 20-40 years old Men, 20-40 years old Women, 41-65 years old Women, 20-40 years old
Has a child aged 0-1 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Log real hourly wage 2.07 1.91 2.07 2.01 1.35
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Maternity leave legislation 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age 41.04 32.04 31.50 49.29 28.99
(0.16) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.04)
Female 0.60 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) − − − −
Log of real weekly non-labor income 5.78 5.87 5.66 5.84 5.59
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Cohabiting or married 0.63 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.48
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Race
White 0.54 0.55 0.49 0.56 0.60
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Black 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Asian 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Amerindian 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Other 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.36 0.33
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Years of education 12.18 13.03 12.18 12.02 10.99
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Work
Night 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Part night 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.05 0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Seniority 12.40 6.32 6.72 17.25 3.29
(0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.03)
Statutory 0.71 0.63 0.66 0.79 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) −
Work card 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.11 1.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) −
State’s unemployment rate 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Union 0.38 0.32 0.28 0.46 0.25
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Source: Author’s tabulation using the PNADs from 2003 until 2009. Standard errors in parentheses.
4Even though employers are not required to give meal tickets, private firms that choose to offer meal
tickets receive tax incentives, according to the law 6,321.
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Figure 4.1: Proportion of females over time, among state employees aged 20-40.
Source: Author’s tabulation using the PNADs from 2003 until 2009.
The “Not Extended” line shows the proportion of female state employees in states that have not extended
the maternity leave length for their own employees. The “Extended” line depicts the proportion of female
state employees in states that have extended the maternity leave length for their own employees.“LB”
and “UB” are the lower and upper (pointwise) 95% bounds of the estimates for the proportion of female
state employees in states that have not extended the maternity leave.
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of the real hourly wage.
Source: Author’s tabulation using the PNADs from 2003 until 2009. t=0 indicates the date of the
extension. t=1 indicates one year after the extension. Other t’s defined similarly. The line labeled
“Women 20-40” represents the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage of female state employees aged
20-40. The line labeled “Men 20-40” depicts the natural logarithm of real hourly wage of male state
employees aged 20-40. The line labeled “Women 41-65” represents the natural logarithm of the real
hourly wage of female state employees aged 41-54. The line labeled “Women 20-40 (private)” depicts
the natural logarithm of real hourly wage of female private sector employees aged 20-40.
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Figure 4.3: Evolution of the proportion of female employees aged 20-30 that have a child
aged 0-1, by sector.
Source: Author’s tabulation using the PNADs from 2003 until 2009. t=0 indicates the date of the
extension. t=1 indicates one year after the extension. Other t’s defined similarly. The “Public (20-30)”
line depicts the proportion of female state employees aged 20-30 that have a child aged 0-1. The “Private
(20-30)” line represents the proportion of female private-sector employees aged 20-30 that have a child
aged 0-1. “UB” and “LB” are the lower and upper pointwise 95% bounds for the proportion of female
state employees aged 20-30 that have a child aged 0-1.
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Table 4.7: Triple difference estimates of lagged effects of extending the maternity leave length
on the probability of having a child aged one or less, for 20-30 female state employees
Public Sector Private Sector
Control: Men aged 20-30 a Control: Women aged 20-30 b
Eligible for treatment × maternity leave legislation 0.042 (0.028) 0.012 (0.025)
Maternity leave legislation −0.033? (0.018) −0.003 (0.008)
Eligible for treatment −0.077 (0.528) −0.319 (0.334)
Constant −0.290 (0.346) −0.051 (0.156)
Adj-R2 0.11 0.08
N 7,282 37,761
Source: Author’s estimations using the PNADs from 2003 until 2009.
Block bootstrapped errors, by State, in parentheses. Number of bootstrap
replications equals 1,000. Significance levels: ? = 0.10,
?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
a This model uses men aged 20-30 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X
variables as in Model (4) of the previous table.
b This model uses private sector female employees aged 20-30 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2
using the same set of X variables as in Model (4) of the previous table.
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Table 4.9: Triple difference estimates of lagged effects of extending the maternity leave length
on the probability of having a child aged 2 to 5, for 20-30 female state employees
Public Sector Private Sector
Control: Men aged 20-30 a Control: Women aged 20-30 b
Eligible for treatment × maternity leave legislation 0.017 (0.029) 0.006 (0.026)
Maternity leave legislation −0.014 (0.016) −0.004 (0.009)
Eligible for treatment 0.127 (0.595) 0.170 (0.343)
Constant 0.012 (0.531) −0.052 (0.147)
Adj-R2 0.19 0.15
N 7,282 37,761
Source: Author’s estimations using the PNADs from 2003 until 2009.
Block bootstrapped errors, by State, in parentheses. Number of bootstrap
replications equals 1,000. Significance levels: ? = 0.10,
?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
a This model uses men aged 20-30 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X
variables as in Model (4) of the previous table.
b This model uses private sector female employees aged 20-30 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2
using the same set of X variables as in Model (4) of the previous table.
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Table 4.11: Triple difference estimates of lagged effects of extending the maternity leave
length on the probability of having a child aged 6 to 10, for 20-30 female state employees
Public Sector Private Sector
Control: Men aged 20-30 a Control: Women aged 20-30 b
Eligible for treatment × maternity leave legislation 0.015 (0.028) 0.031 (0.027)
Maternity leave legislation 0.016 (0.015) 0.001 (0.012)
Eligible for treatment 0.359 (0.657) 0.321 (0.492)
Constant 1.017?? (0.511) 1.078??? (0.225)
Adj-R2 0.12 0.13
N 7,282 37,761
Source: Author’s estimations using the PNADs from 2003 until 2009.
Block bootstrapped errors, by State, in parentheses. Number of bootstrap
replications equals 1,000. Significance levels: ? = 0.10,
?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
a This model uses men aged 20-30 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2 using the same set of X
variables as in Model (4) of the previous table.
b This model uses private sector female employees aged 20-30 as the control group. It estimates Equation 2.2
using the same set of X variables as in Model (4) of the previous table.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion for parental leave studies
Since 2006, several Brazilian states have been extending the maternity leave length for
their own employees from 120 to 180 days. This was the first instance where the extension
of maternity leave in Brazil was brought without any other important changes in the labor
market. The first part of this dissertation aimed at estimating the effect of those extensions.
Two databases were used to address this question: the Annual Report on Social Informa-
tion (RAIS); and the National Household Sample Survey (PNAD). RAIS is an administrative
data containing information on the employee level. Its main advantages are its coverage of
the formal jobs and its structure, which enables the construction of a panel. Nonetheless,
information from RAIS is classified and the access to this database was incomplete and
limited. These limitations restricted the analyses to consider only 21 of the 27 states of
Brazil during the period 2006-2010. To give robustness for RAIS results, data from the
PNADs of 2001 until 2009 were also used. PNAD is a cross-section representative of the
Brazilian households. It not only offers a larger pre-intervention period, but also contains
several socio-economic variables for each component of the household, giving a much richer
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set of characteristics than RAIS. This enabled exploring some other features not available
in RAIS, such as assessing the effect of the influence of the extension on the probability of
having older children.
In general, the analyses suggest a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect of the
extension on wages of female state employees aged 20-40. If fixed effects are taken as the
favorite specification, difference-in-difference estimates using RAIS data allow excluding any
wage decrease of more than 3%, at a 5% significance. By looking at the subsample of
entrants, it is also possible to dismiss the possibility that this effect was driven by a decrease
in the wages of entrants. But, as previously mentioned, given the limitations of the data
available for this dissertation, it might be that RAIS results are subestimating the total
effect on wages. Indeed, difference-in-difference results from PNAD tend to suggest larger
effects of the extension than those obtained using RAIS. Nonetheless, the triple difference
estimates, which require fewer assumptions than the difference-in-differences approach, from
RAIS and PNAD are similar in magnitude.
The evidence of a modest, though statistically insignificant, effect on wages is in tune
with the results from the literature and lies within reasonable bounds given by the expected
increase in the employers’ costs entailed by the extension. The empirical literature points
to either a negative (Ruhm, 1998; Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck, 2007) or an insignificant ef-
fect (Klerman and Leibowitz, 1997; Zveglich Jr and Van der Meulen Rodgers, 2003; Baum,
2003b). For Brazil, in particular, de Carvalho, Firpo, and Gonzaga (2006) find no statisti-
cally significant effect of the 1988’s extension on wages.
Regarding the results on the effect of the decision to have a child, RAIS data only allow
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estimating the effect on the probability of taking a maternity leave. With this caution in
mind, results suggest an increase of some 17% in this probability. PNAD results corroborate
the positive statistically insignificant result obtained in RAIS. More specifically, an increase
of some 11% in the probability of having a child aged 0-1 is suggested by PNAD.
Despite their lack of precision,1 these results are of a similar magnitude to the results
obtained in the international literature. Indeed, for Austria, Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2009)
estimate a short-run increase in fertility of some 15%. For tax incentives, Milligan (2005)
estimates that the effect on fertility was about 10% in Quebec.
PNAD results also allow assessing the effects on the probability of having older children.
In fact, a positive, but statistically insignificant effect on the probability of having a child
aged 6-10 is estimated. This might be suggesting that people that already had kids were
attracted to the public sector after the extension, or that people who already had kids became
less prone to leave the public sector. In any of those cases, it would also be expected that
the probability of having a child aged 2-5 would increase. Given the lack of precision in the
estimates, despite the small magnitude of the point estimates of the effect of the extension
on the probability of having a child aged 2-5, it is not possible to rule out these possibilities.
Finally, RAIS data provide some evidence that the extension increased the attractiveness
of the public sector to women in their prime childbearing ages, but the estimates lack pre-
cision. For instance, point estimates suggest a decrease in the turnover rate of 20-30 female
state employees, a decrease in the entrance age and an increase in the exit age. But none of
those effects are statistically significant and the effects on age are of a small magnitude.
1For PNAD, the lack of precision might be stemming from individual heterogeneities and from sampling
bias.
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It is important to highlight some limitations to the results discussed in this dissertation.
First, they only focus on the short-run impacts of the extensions, further research on long-
term impacts is needed to give a complete picture of the effects of the extension. For instance,
if the main mechanism used to adjust wages is promotions and demotions it might be that
the effect on wages will take longer to be completed. On the other hand, for the probability
of taking a maternity leave, the short-run might overstate the long-run impact, since part
of the incentives of the extension of the maternity leave could be simply to advance the
decision of when to have a child. Second, data from RAIS provide a short pre-treatment
period. Third, RAIS excludes six of the twenty seven Brazilian states, which might bring
bias to the estimates. For wages, basing solely on the increase in the expected costs of
the employer suggests that, if any, the bias should be towards zero. Nonetheless, PNAD
estimates using triple differences are similar in magnitude to those of RAIS. For the analysis
of the probability of taking a leave, RAIS data is limited even further, suggesting caution
in reading those estimates. Fourth, the effect on public sector employees might be different
than in other subgroups of the population. Finally, this dissertation does not assess the effect
of extending the maternity leave on several other important outcomes, such as the health
of mothers or infants. There is a growing literature linking maternity leave with, inter
alia, reducing child mortality (Winegarden and Bracy, 1995; Ruhm, 2000; Rossin, 2011),
improving child well-being (Baum, 2003a; Berger, Hill, and Waldfogel, 2005) and improving
mother health outcomes (Chatterji and Markowitz, 2005).
With these cautions in mind, results suggest the extension did not have significant effects
on important labor market outcomes, such as wages. This might be indicative that the
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distortions generated by the extension were not significant and that similar future extensions
might be positive, as previously obtained by de Carvalho, Firpo, and Gonzaga (2006) for the
Brazilian case. Nonetheless, future research of the effects on non-labor market outcomes,
such as health outcomes is important to give a complete assessment of the effects of the
extension.
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Chapter 6
Gender differences in housework
hours in Brazil, 2001 and 2009
6.1 Introduction
Women still do most of the housework, despite the change in their role in the society.
Notably, labor market participation of females, especially of mothers of infants, has risen
in the last decades, and the probability that mothers interrupt their careers has decreased.
Nonetheless, among couples, women are still responsible for about two thirds of the house-
work (Alvarez and Miles, 2003).1
This unequal division among couples has been the focus of several theories. Becker
(1991) emphasizes the benefits of specialization due to relative advantages of each spouse.
The bargaining power theory assumes that this asymmetry among couples is a consequence
of the difference in their economic power (McElroy and Horney, 1981). Finally, the “doing
gender” and socialization theories highlight the importance of roles and values in housework.
For instance, in the “doing gender” approach, housework is considered a symbolic expression
1For a summary of average housework hours by gender from several papers, see Table 1 of Hersch (2003).
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of gender relations (West and Zimmerman, 1987).
In general, empirical studies that aim at explaining this asymmetric division of household
labor have found that observable characteristics have very little explanatory power (Alvarez
and Miles, 2003), suggesting that gender-specific effects are the most important factor.
The literature on trends in housework hours is more scarce, partially due to lack of
historical data. Even though data on labor market hours have been systematically collected
in several countries, data on hours spent on non-market activities are less frequent. For
instance, in the US, data on housework hours have started to be collected on a continuous
basis only after 2003.2
This literature on trends, in general, points to a decrease in housework hours for women
and an increase in the housework hours for men (Gershuny and Robinson, 1988; Bianchi
et al., 2000; Fisher et al., 2007; Sayer, 2010). For the US in particular, Bianchi et al. (2000)
commented that a woman in the 1990s would do about half of the housework that a woman
in the 1960s did and emphasized that the probability of doing some housework decreased
during that period. Furthermore, they noted that the decrease in housework hours reported
until the 1980s has leveled off.
Concerning Brazil, only a few papers have focused on housework. Rangel (2006) analyzed
the impact of extending alimony rights to cohabiting couples. He found that increasing the
bargaining power of women is associated with reducing their probability of doing house-
work. Soares and Sabo´ia (2007) and Soares (2008) provided a descriptive analysis of the
2Data collection occurred at some points before 2003. For an effort of harmonizing 40 years of data in
the US, see the American Heritage Time Use Study and the work of Fisher et al. (2007). For Europe, see
Harmonized European Time Study.
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housework hours in Brazil. Madalozzo, Martins, and Shiratori (2010), using Tobit models,
estimated a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gender gap in housework hours using 2006
data and concluded that the observable characteristics contribute very little to the gap, but
their main focus was the influence of housework on women’s labor market conditions. Fi-
nally, Fava (2010) has two chapters on household production in Brazil. In the first chapter
she concluded that the bargaining process between couples shapes decisions about durable
goods expenditure. More specifically, the higher the female bargaining power, the higher
the relative allocation between production and entertainment durable goods. In the second
chapter, she focuses on the family’s decision on expenditures in maid services and in produc-
tion durable goods. It is important to highlight that maid services are much more common
in Brazil than in developed countries. The results suggest that in households where the wife
has a higher level of education than the husband, the probability of hiring maid services is
higher. She also obtained that a daughters’ time is a substitute for maid-service and a wive’s
time in home production.
This paper aims at contributing to the Brazilian literature by estimating a Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition for the housework hours gap in 2001 and in 2009 and by looking at
its evolution. The focus on the Brazilian case is also of interest for the international literature
for at least four reasons. First, the database used, which is representative of the Brazilian
population, is of a larger size than most of the existing papers. Second, the database contains
information on the housework hours of every component of the household. Third, there is a
lack of literature on developing countries. Fourth, to my knowledge, among the few papers
that have looked at the evolution of the gap over time, none has applied a decomposition to
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shed light on the evolution.
A better understanding of the sources of household gap and their contribution to the
evolution of the gap is also useful for designing policies. For instance, several countries have
enacted pieces of legislation to alleviate women from the burden of accumulating market
and house work. 3 The countries came up with several solutions, e.g., subsidized childcare,
maternity leave provisions, responsible parenting policies, subsidies for durable market goods
and investment in education. Given a fixed budget, which option (or combination) would
be more effective? Even though this paper does not provide a final answer to this question,
knowing whether differences in observed characteristics or differences in returns are more
important in explaining the gap in housework hours and its evolution should help choosing
and designing better policies.
As a preview, the results indicate that in the 2001-2009 period, the gender gap in house-
work hours narrowed. In general, over this period, Brazilian women decreased their amount
of housework. Cohabiting or married men slightly increased their amount of housework,
whereas single men decreased their amount of housework. The Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sition of the gap, in each year, highlights that only a small part of the housework hours
differential between genders is attributable to differences in their characteristics. Nonethe-
less, a substantial part of the observed change in the gap could be attributed to changes
in the observable characteristics. When looking at the whole country, the most important
contributors for the narrowing of the gap were economic power, cohort and education. A
3Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2007) used data from 25 countries to study total work time (market and
non-market). They obtained that the Gross Domestic Product is negatively related to the gap in total work
time. In particular, for developed countries there was no gender difference in terms of total work time.
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more disaggregated analysis suggests important regional differences. For instance, in 2009,
the region with the highest gender gap in terms of housework hours among cohabiting or
married people was the Northeast, some 26 hours per week, whereas the lowest was the
South, some 19.5 hours per week. For all regions, there was a decrease in the gender gap
from 2001 to 2009, but the decrease was less strong in the Northeast. These movements led
to an increase in the difference between the Northeast gender housework gap and the gaps in
other Brazilian regions. Finally, the housework gap also varied substantially depending on
the level of family income. The gap among those in the top 20% range of family income was
about 23 hours per week in 2001, whereas, among the bottom 20%, it was some 34 hours.
In 2009, those gaps decreased to some 29 and 18 hours per week, respectively.
6.2 Data and methodology
To shed light on the gender difference in hours spent on housework, I will follow the literature
on gender gap and estimate the decomposition suggested4 by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca
(1973). More specifically, for each time period, t, I will compute:
δtfm =
{
Eβtf
[
ytf |xtf
]− Eβtf [ytm|xtm]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Characteristics
+
{
Eβtf
[
ytm|xtm
]− Eβtm [ytm|xtm]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Coefficients
= βˆtf (X
t
f −X tm) + (βˆtf − βˆtm)X
t
m (6.1)
The two first terms of the decomposition (“Characteristics”) form the part explained
by differences in the covariate levels between the two groups, whereas the other terms are
4For the generalization to non-linear models, see Bauer, Go¨hlmann, and Sinning (2007); Bauer and
Sinning (2008, 2010) and for a review of decomposition methods, see Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011).
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the part explained by changes in the return of those covariates. For instance, if the gap
is mainly explained by differences in economic power, this should be reflected in a greater
participation of the “Characteristics” part of the decomposition. The “Coefficients” part,
captures, among other things, social norms and discrimination.
Estimates of the decomposition require computing the sample counterparts of the condi-
tional expectations of Eq.(6.1). In practice, estimating a model for each gender provides all
the information needed for the computations.
After analyzing the level of the gap, I will focus on its evolution between 2001 and 2009,
by following Smith and Welch (1989) and estimating: 5
δtfm − δt−1fm = βˆt−1f
[
(X
t
f −X tm)− (X t−1f −X t−1m )
]
+
[
(βˆt−1f − βˆt−1m )(X
t
m −X t−1m )
]
+
[
(βˆtf − βˆt−1f )(X
t
f −X tm)
]
+
[
(βˆtf − βˆtm)− (βˆt−1f − βˆt−1m )
]
X
t
m (6.2)
According to the equation above, changing the difference between the characteristics
of females and males would influence the gap through two channels. The first, denoted
main effects, reflects the direct effect of those changes, weighted by the 2001 returns to the
characteristics of females. The second, captured by the gender interaction term, emphasizes
that given different returns to the characteristics between genders in the base year, a change
in the level of the characteristics of males would also influence the gap.
5This is the decomposition using females as a reference. Using males, it would be:
δtfm − δt−1fm = βˆt−1m
[
(X
t
f −X
t
m)− (X
t−1
f −X
t−1
m )
]
+
[
(βˆt−1f − βˆt−1m )(X
t
f −X
t−1
f )
]
+
[
(βˆtm − βˆt−1m )(X
t
f −X
t
m)
]
+
[
(βˆtf − βˆtm)− (βˆt−1f − βˆt−1m )
]
X
t
f
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The two last terms of the decomposition capture changes in the return. The year in-
teraction captures the change in the gap due to change in the returns for the females from
2001 to 2009, evaluated at the characteristics in 2009. The gender-year interaction reflects
changes in the gap stemming from changes in the relative returns across gender over time,
evaluated at the 2009 levels of male characteristics.
Despite its usefulness, this decomposition has been criticized due to the difficulty of
interpreting its components. In this paper, I will provide the whole decomposition, but
will also follow Wellington (1993) and focus on the aggregate effect of main effects and the
gender interaction term into a component named “Characteristics” and the aggregate effect
of the year interaction and the gender-year interaction terms in to a component named
“Coefficients”: 6
δtfm − δt−1fm =
[
βˆt−1f (X
t
f −X t−1f )− βˆt−1m (X tm −X t−1m )
]
+
[
(βˆtf − βˆt−1f )X
t
f − (βˆtm − βˆt−1m )X tm
]
(6.3)
To estimate the aforementioned decompositions, this work will use the National House-
hold Sample Survey (PNAD). The PNAD, which is conducted annually and has a complex
design, is a cross-section of Brazilian households.7 In the first stage, all municipalities in
Brazil are divided into three groups: metropolitan areas, auto-representative and non-auto-
representative. The first two groups are automatically included in the sample, whereas for
the third group, which encompasses the majority of the Brazilian municipalities, the inclu-
6Notice that the Wellington decomposition does not depend on the reference group being males or females.
7For further information on the PNAD, see http://www.metadados.ibge.gov.br/detalhePesquisa.aspx?cod=PD
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sion is based on a sampling mechanism that attributes to each municipality a probability
of being drawn proportional to its population in the previous census. In the second stage,
smaller regions, known as census sectors, are chosen using probability proportional to their
population. In the last stage,8 households are chosen based on a simple systematic sampling,
with probability proportional to size. Once a household is interviewed, it is no longer eligible
to be drawn until the next census, so no household is surveyed more than once between any
two censuses.9
The analyses will focus on the years 2001 and 2009. It was only after 2001 that the PNAD
included questions concerning the amount of housework hours.10 The PNAD of 2009 is the
last available, since 2010 there was no data collection for PNAD because of the decennial
Census.
Rural areas were not included in the analyses because the PNAD did not contain data
on the rural areas of Acre, Amapa´, Amazonas, Para´, Rondoˆnia and Roraima before 2004.
According to IBGE11 the percentage of people living in rural areas decreased from 18.75%
in 2000 to 15.65% in 2010.
PNAD considers all people living in the same domicile as household members,12 making
it possible to have a household with more than one family unit. More specifically, household
is considered as a “dwelling place of a person or group of persons, where the relationship
8Both the first and second stages are conducted only once between censuses. For the third stage, the list
of possible surveyed households is updated every year.
9In this work, every singleton PSU in a given point of time and state was aggregated into the largest PSU
available at that time in that state.
10 Before 2001, there was only the question whether the person would help or not with the housework.
11http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/presidencia/noticias/noticia visualiza.php?id noticia=1766, accessed on
06/14/2012.
12For further information see, inter alia, Medeiros, Osorio, and Varella (2002).
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is based on consanguinity, domestic dependence or co-residence norms.”IBGE (2012).13 As
Madalozzo, Martins, and Shiratori (2010), I use the family unit as the basis for the analyses.
Before going to the description of the data, it is worth mentioning some of the PNAD’s
strengths and drawbacks. First, it is representative of the Brazilian population and not only
of a few segments as the data used in several of the previous works (c.f., Alvarez and Miles
(2003) and Greenstein (2000)). Second, it contains information on every component of the
household. For instance, the American Time Use Surveys only provide information on one
person per household. On the other hand, the PNAD provides information only on the total
amount of housework, preventing any disaggregation and is not based on a diary.14 Besides,
the PNAD only started collecting information on the marital status in 2009. Finally, part
of the PNAD data is self-reported.
The way PNAD questions are designed is of importance to the analyses. In particular,
the PNAD questionnaire has two questions concerning housework hours. First, whether the
household member did any housework during a particular week, e.g., for 2009, the week was
from September the 20th to the 26th. If so, it asks what the usual weekly housework hours
are. This sequence of questions leads the possibility of two types of zero housework hours.
The first consists of zeros from household members that do not participate in housework.
The second is formed by household members that do participate in housework, but, for some
reason, did not participate in the particular week chosen by the survey.
13See also IBGE (2009).
14For instance, Kimmel and Connelly (2007) have shown the importance of separating child care from
other household activities. See, inter alia, Robinson (1985) for the advantages of time dairy data. Those
advantages do not come without a cost, the use of diary data creates an imbalance between the period of
interest for the research and the reference period of the survey. This increases the number of observations
reporting zero hours and introduces some other difficulties, see Stewart (2009).
74
The presence of this second type of zeros brings bias to the Tobit analysis, according
to Stewart (2009). Indeed, that author shows that for the ideal case where the two groups
reporting zeros are known, OLS is preferred over Tobit or a two-part model,15 because it is
unbiased. Stewart (2009) simulations confirm the preference for OLS and also show that a
two-part model outperforms the Tobit. In fact, two-part models were very close to OLS, in
most of the scenarios in that paper. For the general case, where the identity of the groups
is not known, all estimators are biased, but his simulations still favored OLS. Therefore,
because of the design of PNAD, I will depart from the literature and use OLS instead of
Tobit in all estimations.
I estimate separate models for single and cohabiting or married people.16 This will not
only respect the differences in the decision process, but also make results comparable to the
existing literature.
In the models for cohabiting or married people, I consider the influence of economic
power. This variable, here measured as the proportion of family income that the individual
holds, as in Madalozzo, Martins, and Shiratori (2010), is commonly used in the literature,
but is potentially endogenous. Since endogeneity would bring bias to estimates, for every
model including economic power, I will also report an analogous estimation without this
variable. 17
15A model is denoted two-part (hurdle) when the probability of non-zero outcome is modeled separately
from the level conditional on not being zero.
16It was only in 2009 that PNAD included a variable describing marital status. For comparison reasons
to 2001, I focus on married or cohabiting status instead.
17The few works that recognize the potential endogeneity of economic power tend to either correct it
using a Heckman approach, which relies heavily on the normality assumption, or to use the relative level of
education as a proxy for economic power. For a more in-depth review of this potential endogeneity problem,
see Gupta and Stratton (2010).
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Before going to the results, in the following paragraphs, I present some descriptive statis-
tics and some histograms of the main variable under study.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide descriptive statistics. Women do more housework than men
independent of cohabiting/marital status. In general, women reduced their amount of house-
work hours between 2001 and 2009, by some 11% among single and by some 17% among
cohabiting or married. This decrease in housework hours is in tune with international evi-
dence (Gershuny and Robinson, 1988; Bianchi et al., 2000; Fisher et al., 2007). Nonetheless,
the level of housework hours is still much higher than in the US, c.f. Artis and Pavalko
(2003), and the rate of decrease among women is greater than the observed decrease in
the 1985-1995 period reported by Bianchi et al. (2000)18 for the US. Single men decreased
their amount of housework hours by some 6%, whereas cohabiting or married increased their
amount of housework by some 6% during the 2001-2009 period. This increase among cohab-
iting or married men was also reported in other countries, e.g., for the US, Bianchi et al.
(2000, pg. 223).
Finally, there are still three more points that are worth emphasizing in these tables. First
the increase in the level of education, which occurred independent of gender and cohabit-
ing/marital status. Second, the increase of almost 25% in the economic power of cohabiting
or married women in the 2001-2009 period. Third, the decrease in the probability of having
a young child (aged 0-5), for both single and married/cohabiting people.
To gain more information about household hours between gender and cohabiting/marital
status, I plot their histograms in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2. There is a high proportion
18Indeed the percentage decrease observed in the 2001-2009 period for Brazil is comparable to the decrease
reported by Bianchi et al. (2000, pg. 222) for the 1975-1985 period in the US.
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of people reporting zero housework hours, especially among cohabiting or married men.
Furthermore, the distribution of housework hours is more concentrated on smaller amounts
of housework for men than for women. Hence, men not only tend to participate less in
housework hours, but even among those who participate, the amount of housework hours
that they perform tends to be lower than that of women.
Concerning the change over the period 2001-2009, the main points emphasized by these
histograms are the increase in the probability of participation in housework among single
men and the decrease in participation among cohabiting or married women.
6.3 Results
In this section, I present the main results by marital/cohabiting status. I analyze the weekly
amount of housework and its components: the probability of doing some housework; and
the amount of housework among those who do some housework. For married or cohabiting
people, I also look into the proportion of housework performed by males and present some
analyses of how the weekly amount of housework varies by region and levels of family income.
6.3.1 Single people
Table 6.3 presents OLS estimates for single people in 2001, by gender. The first columns
focus on the probability of doing some housework. Notice that there is a significant variation
between regions, independent of the gender. In particular, people from the South are, on
average, more prone to participate in housework than people from the Southeast (the omitted
category). Furthermore, people with higher levels of education (15 years or more) tend
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to participate less than other people. The other columns present OLS estimates for the
housework hours among those who participate and the amount of housework in general. It
is interesting to notice that among single women, even though having a young kid (aged
0-10) does not seem to have a significant relationship with the probability of doing some
housework, it has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the amount of
housework. A stronger relationship also arises for cohorts and for levels of education.
Table 6.4 emphasizes that the main patterns obtained in Table 6.3 are also valid for 2009.
Nonetheless, notice that the relationship between the education levels and housework hours
became weaker (closer to zero) and less statistically significant than in 2001.
Using estimates from 6.3 and 6.4, Table 6.5 shows the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for
single people. The first rows focus on the probability of doing some housework. The gap
among single people reduced some 22%, from some 0.18 in 2001 to some 0.14 percentage
points in 2009. Looking at the decomposition itself, notice that only a small percentage of the
housework participation gap can be attributed to observed characteristics. By decomposing
the coefficients part into two components, one that can be attributed to different coefficients
on the characteristics, another that captures the contribution of different coefficients on the
constant term, it becomes clear that a substantial part of the gap is attributed to different
coefficients on the constant term, independent of the reference or year. Indeed, this was to
be expected, given the low explanatory power obtained in the OLS estimates.
The same pattern of a decrease in the gap and low contribution of the characteristics
to explaining the gap happens to the gap among those who participate in housework, and
consequently, to the weekly amount of housework hours in general. The gap among those
78
who participate reduced some 13%, from some 12.5 to some 11 hours per week in 2009,
whereas the overall gap in housework hours changed from some 14 to some 12 hours per
week during the same period.
Looking at the levels of the gap for single people in 2001 and 2009 raises the following
concern in terms of policy: it seems that even if it were possible for women and men to
have the same level of characteristics (at least those observed by the econometrician), e.g.,
education, age or number of children, the gap should not narrow too much. This might
be reflecting, as the literature has been pointing out (Alvarez and Miles, 2003), that social
and cultural differences are important in looking at housework differences. In this sense, the
evidence from Table 6.5 favors measures such as educational campaigns aiming at redesigning
roles in the society over changes in the observable characteristics as better guided towards
reducing the housework gap among single people.
Nonetheless, Table 6.5 results are pointing towards a decline in the housework differential.
Did the observed characteristics play any role in this evolution? In general, what were the
main contributors to the narrowing of the gap?
To address these questions, Tables 6.6 and 6.7 present the Smith-Welch decomposition
for the evolution of the housework gap among single people.
Table 6.6 presents the detailed Smith-Welch decomposition for the probability of doing
some housework. In general, observable characteristics, which are decomposed into ‘Main
Effect’ and ‘Year Interaction’, once again, do not contribute too much for the narrowing of
some 0.4 percentage points in the gap. Indeed, had it been solely for those characteristics,
independent of the reference, the gap in the probability of doing some housework would have
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actually increased.
As Table 6.6 highlights, the detailed Smith-Welch decomposition suggests that the great-
est contributor to the change the gender gap between 2001 and 2009 among single people was
the constant. Nonetheless, education also played an important role, especially through the
year-gender interaction term of the decomposition. This term reflects the fact that returns
to levels of education became more similar in 2009 in comparison to 2001, thus contributing
to the narrowing in the gender gap in the probability of doing some housework.
Table 6.7 summarizes the results of Table 6.6 and includes Smith-Welch decompositions
for housework hours among those who participate and the level of housework hours in general.
For the housework hours among those who participate in housework, presented in the second
block of rows in Table 6.7, there is an important change. The part attributable to observable
characteristics is the greatest responsible for the narrowing, according to the Smith-Welch
decomposition. Indeed, the table suggests that the gender interaction term by itself would
be contributing to at least 75% of the change. This greater participation of the observed
characteristics in explaining the evolution of the gap is also true for the level of housework
hours in general, as the third block of rows in Table 6.7 emphasizes.
For housework hours among those who participate in housework and the level of house-
work hours in general, the detailed decompositions (not shown) suggest that most of the
gender interaction contribution comes from cohort. For older cohorts, the differences in the
coefficients between male and female in 2001 tended to be negative, whereas for younger
cohorts, it tended to be positive. Given that the relative proportion of younger cohort in-
creases from 2001 to 2009, the net effect is a narrowing of the gap. Intuitively, the gender
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gap between older cohorts tended to be larger so, as time goes by, the overall gap reduces.
Hence, in general, the analyses show that despite their low contribution in explaining
the level of gap in 2001 and 2009, the observable characteristics played an important role
in the narrowing of the gap in housework hours, mainly through cohort. Nonetheless, they
had little to do with explaining the narrowing the gender gap in probability of doing some
housework. For this probability, most of the change was attributed to the constant, being
the second greatest contributor the change in the coefficients for the levels of education,
which became more similar in 2009 between genders than in 2001.
Finally, it is important to highlight that for all outcomes region was the greatest contrib-
utor to widening the gap. According to the Smith-Welch decomposition, its effect worked
mainly through the year-gender interaction term, which captures the fact that the gender
difference in the coefficients for regions tended to increase from 2001 to 2009.
6.3.2 Cohabiting or married people
Focusing on cohabiting or married people in 2001, Table 6.8 presents OLS estimates for the
probability of doing some housework, for the amount of housework among those who do
some housework and for the housework hours in general, by gender.
For the probability of doing some housework, there are some similarities with the case
of single people. First, independent of the gender, there is a significant variation between
regions. Once again, people from the South are more prone to participate in housework
than those from the Southeast (the omitted category). Second, people with higher levels of
education (15 years or more) participate less in housework than other people, independent
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of the gender. Third, having older daughters, aged 11 or more, is negatively associated with
housework participation among cohabiting or married men.
Nonetheless, there are also some important differences from the analysis of single people.
First, in 2001, there is a stronger difference in housework participation among cohabiting or
married men than among singles, with older cohorts tending to participate less. Second, the
relationship between having a young kid and housework participation is less strong and, most
of the time, not significant among cohabiting or married men. Finally, Table 6.8 suggests
that having daughters aged 16-17 was negative related to women’s housework participation.
This is consistent with the findings of Fava (2010), who obtains that the time of daughters
is a substitute for the time wives spend doing housework.
The other columns of Table 6.8 present OLS estimates for the housework hours among
those who participate and the amount of housework in general. Once again, among women,
having a young kid is statistically significant in explaining the amount of housework among
those who participate, but not in explaining the probability of doing some housework.
Table 6.9 shows analogous results for 2009. In general, the main picture from the previous
table did not change. It is important, nonetheless, to highlight that the regional differences
for the probability of doing some housework were stronger in 2009 than in 2001.
Table 6.10 presents the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for cohabiting or married people.
As in the case of single people, there was a decrease in the gender gap during the 2001-2009
period. In particular, the gender gap in the probability of doing some housework decreased
some 8 percentage points (16%), from some 50 in 2001 to some 42 percentage points in 2009.
For the housework hours among those who participate in housework, the gap reduced from
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some 24 to some 20 hours per week. Those movements led the gap in housework hours to
decrease from some 29 to some 23 hours per week.
As for the components explaining the levels of the gap, Table 6.10 suggests that most of
the gap is explained by the differences in the coefficients for the constant, as obtained for the
case of single people. In fact, the contribution of the observed characteristics to explaining
the gap is even smaller than in the analysis of single people.
The last rows of Table 6.10 show the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for models including
economic power. Despite the increase in the contribution of different characteristics to
explaining the level of the gap, most of the gap is still attributable to differences in the
coefficients on the constant term.
Therefore, according to the results from the decomposition, independent of including
economic power to the analyses, the gap should not reduce too much in the case where the
levels of observed characteristics were the same for both genders. In this sense, the results
highlight, once more, the importance of social and cultural differences in explaining the level
of the gap.
Nonetheless, the level of the gap decreased in the 2001-2009 period, so what were the
main contributors? Tables 6.11 and 6.12 shed some light on this question, by reporting the
Smith-Welch decomposition of the change in the gap.
As in the case of single people, according to Table 6.11, the importance of the observed
characteristics (main effect and gender interaction terms) is greater in explaining the evo-
lution of the gap for the probability of doing some housework than its individual levels.
The detailed decomposition reveals that most of the explanatory power of the observable
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characteristics stems from changes in education and cohort. Nonetheless, education also con-
tributed to increasing the gap, mainly through the year-gender interaction term. Therefore,
when considering all components of the decomposition, cohort and the cohort × education
interaction become the greatest contributors to the narrowing of the gap, after the constant.
The year-gender interaction was the most important term for those variables. For cohort,
this suggests that part of the narrowing of the gap in the probability of doing some house-
work stemmed from the fact that the gender difference in estimated coefficients of the cohort
dummies was smaller in 2009 than in 2001.
Table 6.12 summarizes the results from Table 6.11 and includes more outcomes. The first
rows present results excluding economic power, whereas the last rows include this variable
to the analyses. Independent of the outcome or the inclusion of economic power, observed
characteristics contribute more to the evolution than to the level of the gaps.
For the housework hours among those who participate in housework and the level of
housework hours (including zeros), the detailed decompositions (not shown) also point to
cohort as the second greatest contributor, after the constant term. The main difference is
that the most important term for the cohort contribution was the gender interaction. The
gender interaction term is capturing the effect of a smaller gap for younger cohorts, which,
as time goes by, leads to an overall decrease in the gap. More specifically, the differences
in the coefficients between male and female in 2001 for older cohorts tended to be negative,
whereas for younger cohorts positive. Therefore, the increase in the relative proportion of
the younger cohorts from 2001 to 2009 contributed to the narrowing of the gap.
Finally, as in the case of single people, for all outcomes, had it not been for the contribu-
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tion of regions, the widening of the gap would have been stronger. Indeed, according to the
Smith-Welch decomposition regional differences have contributed mainly through the year-
gender interaction term, which captures the fact that the gender difference in the coefficients
for regions tended to increase from 2001 to 2009.
To sum up, for married or cohabiting people, the Smith-Welch decompositions suggest
that most of the narrowing of the gap is explained by differences in the coefficients of the
constant. Nonetheless, cohorts also played an important role, but through different channels
depending on the outcome. For housework participation, the main channel was the narrowing
of the gap within cohorts over the 2001-2009 period. For the amount of housework, the main
contribution was through the increase in the relative proportion of the younger cohorts,
which tend to have a smaller gap than the older.
Including economic power to the analyses increases the explanatory power of the observed
characteristics for all outcomes. Nonetheless, apart from that and from the inclusion of
economic power as the second greatest contributor, the main picture from the previous
analyses is preserved.
6.3.2.1 Proportion of housework performed by males, cohabiting or married
people
The previous results suggest a decrease in the gender gap between married or cohabiting.
But this aspect only emphasizes the behavior of the absolute gender difference. It is also
important to analyze how the relative amount of housework evolved from 2001 to 2009.
Indeed, the proportion of housework performed by males among cohabiting or married
people increased some 25% in the 2001-2009 period, changing from some 13 in 2001 to some
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16 percentage points in 2009. The next paragraphs will shed some light on this change.
Table 6.13 shows OLS estimates for the proportion of housework performed by males
among cohabiting or married people. Notice first the negative relationship between having
a young child and the percentage of housework performed by males.19 Second, that the set
of regional dummies is statistically significant in explaining this proportion. Finally, as in
the previous analyses, the explanatory power of the estimated models are low, even with the
inclusion of economic power terms. The regional differences and the low explanatory power
corroborate the idea that a great part of the variation in the proportion of housework stems
from social / cultural norms or other non-observed characteristics.
The first rows of Table 6.14 emphasize that even without the inclusion of terms controlling
for economic power, the contribution of observable characteristics to explaining the evolution
of the proportion of housework hours from 2001 to 2009 was important (at least some 31%).
In detailed decomposition (not shown), among the observable characteristics the greatest
contributor was education.20 More specifically, the overall increase in the level of education
among married or cohabiting men in the 2001-2009 period, contributed to increasing the
percentage of housework that they performed.
6.3.2.2 Gap by regions and family income
In this part, I will complement the previous analyses by looking on how the gap varies
between regions and two extreme levels of family income, the bottom 20% and the top 20%.
The results will focus on the amount of housework hours - including zeros - among married
19Notice that PNAD data do not exclude childcare as housework.
20Including power, education becomes the second greatest.
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and cohabiting people and will exclude economic power.
Table 6.15 focuses on the level of the gaps and their components, by reporting the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition. As in the previous cases, most of the gap is explained by unobserved
characteristics, mainly differences in the coefficients for the constant term. Once again, this
is reflecting the low explanatory power of the estimated models.
One of the main messages of Table 6.15 is that there exists a lot of variation in the gender
differential among the Brazilian regions. For instance, in 2001, the housework hours gap in
the Northeast was some 31 hours, whereas in the South it was some 27 hours. The gap
narrowed in all regions, but the strongest decrease was in the South, some 27%, whereas
the weakest decrease was in the Northeast, some 16%. Therefore, even though the gap
decreased, the variation in the housework gap across regions increased during the 2001-2009
period. This led the Northeast to be even further apart in 2009 from the other regions in
terms of housework hours differential than in 2001.
There is also an important variation in the housework hours gap by family income. In
2001, the gender differential for the bottom 20% was some 34 hours, whereas for the top
20% it was some 23 hours per week. In 2009, these figures reduced to 29 and 18 hours per
week, respectively. As in the case of regions, despite the decrease for all groups, the decrease
in the bottom 20% was weaker, some 16%, than in the top 20%, some 21%. This led to an
increase in the variation of the levels of the gap.
Focusing on the evolution of the gap between 2001 and 2009, Table 6.16 presents the
Smith-Welch decomposition by region and by level of family income. As in the previous
analyses, the contribution of observable characteristics to the evolution of the gap is much
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higher than their contribution to the level of the gap. This contribution is mainly through
the gender interaction term.
Detailed decompositions (not shown) reveal that the constant was, once again, the great-
est contributor to the evolution of the housework gender differential. Nonetheless, there are
important variations concerning the total contribution of the other variables. For instance,
for the Northeast, education was the second most important variable (following the con-
stant). Most of the contribution from education stemmed from the year interaction term,
which reflects that the increase in the overall level of education for males contributed to re-
ducing the housework differential, given that the difference in the coefficients between male
and female for higher levels of education tends to be positive. Education was also important
in explaining the evolution of the housework gap for cohabiting or married people in the
bottom 20% of family income, mainly through the year-gender interaction term. On the
other hand, for the North and the Southeast, cohort was the second greatest contributor.
To sum up, there is an important variation of the housework hours gap among cohabiting
or married people by region and by family income. In both dimensions there was a decrease
in the levels of the gap, but an increase in the dispersion. Furthermore, the main contributors
for the evolution of the gap differ depending on region or level of family income. Hence, it is
important for any policy aiming at changing the housework differential to take into account
those differences when defining their target population.
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6.4 Conclusion
This chapter aimed at studying the gender differential in housework hours and its evolution
in the 2001-2009 period for non-rural people in Brazil.
To address these questions, data were drawn from the National Household Sample Survey,
which is representative of the Brazilian households and contains socio-economic information
for all household components.
Descriptive statistics show that the average housework hours performed by women de-
creased in the 2001-2009 period. For men, there was a decrease in the housework hours
among singles and an increase among cohabiting or married.
Concerning the gap, which decreased from 2001 to 2009, the Oaxaca-Blinder decompo-
sitions highlight that the observed characteristics contribute only a few to understanding
its level, independent of the year under analysis. This low participation suggests that even
if it were possible for women and men to have the same level of characteristics (e.g., edu-
cation, age or number of children), the gap should not narrow too much. This is in tune
with the results obtained in the literature (Madalozzo, Martins, and Shiratori, 2010; Alvarez
and Miles, 2003) and stresses the importance of cultural/social differences in explaining
housework hours differences.
Despite their low participation in explaining the levels of the gap, observed characteristics
played an important role in explaining how the gap has evolved. Detailed decompositions
stress the importance of cohort, education and economic power for understanding the nar-
rowing of the gaps.
89
A more disaggregated analysis suggests important regional differences. For instance, in
2009, the region with the highest gender gap in terms of housework hours among cohabiting
or married people was the Northeast, some 26 hours per week, whereas the lowest was the
South, some 19.5 hours per week. In all regions there was a decrease in the gender gap from
2001 to 2009, but the decrease was weaker in the Northeast, some five hours per week. These
movements led to an increase in the difference between the Northeast housework gap and
the gaps in other Brazilian regions.
The housework gap also varied substantially depending on the level of family income.
In 2001, the gap among those in the top 20% range of family income was about 23 hours
per week, whereas, among the bottom 20%, the gap was some 34 hours. In 2009, the gaps
decreased to some 29 and 18 hours per week, respectively.
In terms of policy, the evidence favors measures such as educational campaigns aiming at
redesigning roles in the society over changes in the observable characteristics. Nonetheless,
those measures should probably have some effect only in the long run. Furthermore, the
analyses highlight the importance of regional and family income differences for the design of
those policies. If the aim is a more egalitarian distribution of housework in the short-run,
policies should focus more directly on easing the burden from the women. In this sense,
discounts in time-saving durable goods or subsidizing the household work could be more
effective measures.
An important message from this paper is that relying solely on cross-section analyses
does not give a complete picture of the gender housework hours gap. In this sense, further
analyses of the dynamics would be relevant to understanding the housework gender gap and
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to designing future policies.
Finally, there are limitations to the results presented in this chapter. First, PNAD
only offers the total amount of housework hours, preventing any kind of disaggregation.
Despite the usefulness of having a big picture, it might be important to look at the behavior
in different tasks. For instance, there is some evidence that childcare activities are treated
differently from other types of housework (Kimmel and Connelly, 2007). Second, PNAD data
prevent the construction of a panel. Hence, unobserved heterogeneities could be biasing the
results in the case those heterogeneities are correlated with some of the explanatory variables.
Nonetheless, this effect might be mitigated in the analyses, as long as the biases are similar
across genders.
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6.5 Figures and tables
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of single people by gender, 2001 and 2009
Female Male
2001 2009 2001 2009
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Weekly housework hours 25.009 0.136 22.236 0.110 10.889 0.150 10.283 0.116
Region
North 0.110 0.002 0.117 0.002 0.123 0.004 0.118 0.004
Northeast 0.295 0.003 0.317 0.003 0.254 0.006 0.272 0.005
Southeast 0.326 0.003 0.299 0.003 0.331 0.006 0.334 0.005
South 0.153 0.003 0.146 0.002 0.164 0.005 0.153 0.004
Midwest 0.115 0.002 0.121 0.002 0.127 0.004 0.124 0.004
Age 43.097 0.091 44.229 0.083 40.731 0.164 41.739 0.144
Cohort
1935-1939 0.079 0.002 − − 0.064 0.003 − −
1940-1944 0.102 0.002 0.024 0.001 0.078 0.004 0.021 0.002
1945-1949 0.114 0.002 0.107 0.002 0.095 0.004 0.078 0.003
1950-1954 0.125 0.002 0.122 0.002 0.112 0.004 0.093 0.003
1955-1959 0.132 0.002 0.136 0.002 0.118 0.004 0.115 0.004
1960-1964 0.126 0.002 0.129 0.002 0.130 0.004 0.120 0.004
1965-1969 0.111 0.002 0.125 0.002 0.127 0.004 0.131 0.004
1970-1974 0.098 0.002 0.107 0.002 0.127 0.004 0.114 0.004
1975-1979 0.088 0.002 0.104 0.002 0.121 0.004 0.123 0.004
1980-1984 0.023 0.001 0.091 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.130 0.004
1985-1989 − − 0.055 0.002 − − 0.075 0.003
Education
0-3 0.141 0.003 0.088 0.002 0.118 0.004 0.075 0.003
4-7 0.132 0.002 0.097 0.002 0.132 0.004 0.093 0.003
8-10 0.419 0.004 0.392 0.003 0.406 0.006 0.375 0.006
11-14 0.224 0.003 0.305 0.003 0.225 0.005 0.322 0.005
15+ 0.084 0.002 0.118 0.002 0.119 0.004 0.135 0.004
Economic power 0.774 0.002 0.760 0.002 0.865 0.003 0.865 0.003
Presence of children
aged 0-2 0.091 0.002 0.068 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.010 0.001
aged 3-5 0.121 0.002 0.093 0.002 0.029 0.002 0.018 0.002
aged 6-10 0.195 0.003 0.178 0.003 0.062 0.003 0.045 0.002
aged 11+, male 0.333 0.003 0.325 0.003 0.120 0.004 0.098 0.003
aged 11+, female 0.371 0.004 0.361 0.003 0.113 0.004 0.100 0.003
Race
Amerindian 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.001
White 0.509 0.004 0.440 0.003 0.503 0.007 0.441 0.006
Black 0.080 0.002 0.103 0.002 0.080 0.004 0.106 0.004
Asian 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.001
Other 0.406 0.004 0.451 0.003 0.410 0.006 0.446 0.006
Source: Author’s tabulation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009. Economic power is defined as income divided by family income.
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for cohabiting or married by gender, 2001 and 2009
Female Male
2001 2009 2001 2009
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Weekly housework hours 34.100 0.089 28.192 0.076 5.046 0.037 5.350 0.034
Region
North 0.115 0.001 0.117 0.001 0.115 0.001 0.117 0.001
Northeast 0.262 0.002 0.276 0.002 0.262 0.002 0.276 0.002
Southeast 0.335 0.002 0.318 0.002 0.335 0.002 0.318 0.002
South 0.173 0.002 0.172 0.002 0.173 0.002 0.172 0.002
Midwest 0.114 0.001 0.117 0.001 0.114 0.001 0.117 0.001
Age 37.532 0.047 38.904 0.046 40.866 0.048 42.061 0.048
Cohort
1935-1939 0.014 0.001 − − 0.042 0.001 − −
1940-1944 0.041 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.066 0.001 0.013 0.000
1945-1949 0.067 0.001 0.032 0.001 0.090 0.001 0.067 0.001
1950-1954 0.101 0.001 0.067 0.001 0.118 0.001 0.092 0.001
1955-1959 0.127 0.001 0.099 0.001 0.144 0.002 0.113 0.001
1960-1964 0.157 0.002 0.122 0.001 0.162 0.002 0.135 0.001
1965-1969 0.169 0.002 0.142 0.001 0.158 0.002 0.143 0.001
1970-1974 0.160 0.002 0.151 0.002 0.135 0.002 0.148 0.002
1975-1979 0.132 0.001 0.159 0.002 0.077 0.001 0.142 0.001
1980-1984 0.031 0.001 0.144 0.001 0.009 0.000 0.107 0.001
1985-1989 − − 0.082 0.001 − − 0.039 0.001
Education
0-3 0.085 0.001 0.052 0.001 0.103 0.001 0.068 0.001
4-7 0.121 0.001 0.077 0.001 0.129 0.001 0.092 0.001
8-10 0.483 0.002 0.402 0.002 0.480 0.002 0.423 0.002
11-14 0.241 0.002 0.354 0.002 0.212 0.002 0.316 0.002
15+ 0.071 0.001 0.115 0.001 0.076 0.001 0.101 0.001
Economic power 0.209 0.001 0.260 0.001 0.700 0.001 0.646 0.001
Presence of children
aged 0-2 0.188 0.002 0.145 0.002 0.188 0.002 0.145 0.002
aged 3-5 0.210 0.002 0.156 0.002 0.210 0.002 0.156 0.002
aged 6-10 0.314 0.002 0.264 0.002 0.314 0.002 0.264 0.002
aged 11+, male 0.327 0.002 0.303 0.002 0.327 0.002 0.303 0.002
aged 11+, female 0.347 0.002 0.328 0.002 0.347 0.002 0.328 0.002
Race
Amerindian 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000
White 0.544 0.002 0.487 0.002 0.524 0.002 0.467 0.002
Black 0.051 0.001 0.074 0.001 0.064 0.001 0.088 0.001
Asian 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000
Other 0.399 0.002 0.432 0.002 0.405 0.002 0.439 0.002
Source: Author’s tabulation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009. Economic power is defined as income divided by family income.
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(a) 2001
(b) 2009
Figure 6.1: Histogram of weekly housework hours for single people, by gender and year
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(a) 2001
(b) 2009
Figure 6.2: Histogram of weekly housework hours for cohabiting or married, by gender and
year
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Table 6.3: OLS estimates for single people in 2001, by gender
Probability of doing some housework Housework Hours - without zeros Housework Hours - with zeros
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Region
North −0.024 (0.016) −0.064??? (0.023) −2.601??? (0.788) 0.608 (0.730) −2.973??? (0.712) −0.427 (0.597)
Northeast −0.014?? (0.006) −0.037? (0.021) −0.190 (0.577) 1.289?? (0.526) −0.559 (0.517) 0.424 (0.487)
South 0.023??? (0.007) 0.089??? (0.017) −1.344? (0.779) 0.090 (0.779) −0.713 (0.762) 1.271? (0.737)
Center-West −0.040??? (0.009) −0.043? (0.025) −3.190??? (0.623) −1.978??? (0.526) −3.837??? (0.592) −2.132??? (0.559)
Education
0-3 0.009 (0.021) −0.006 (0.070) −1.802 (1.488) −3.335? (1.723) −1.407 (1.435) −2.446 (1.552)
4-7 0.005 (0.018) −0.033 (0.057) 0.006 (1.507) −1.560 (1.341) 0.322 (1.496) −1.352 (1.188)
11-14 −0.034?? (0.017) −0.091?? (0.036) −3.835??? (0.750) −2.849??? (0.973) −4.211??? (0.752) −3.287??? (0.802)
15+ −0.102??? (0.024) −0.131?? (0.061) −8.763??? (1.113) −5.870??? (0.853) −9.663??? (1.048) −5.871??? (0.961)
Cohort
1935-1939 0.034??? (0.013) 0.016 (0.043) 11.494??? (0.939) 5.968??? (1.613) 11.909??? (0.994) 4.992??? (1.551)
1940-1944 0.018 (0.014) 0.002 (0.038) 8.237??? (0.940) 4.261??? (1.383) 8.304??? (1.014) 3.594??? (1.201)
1945-1949 0.032??? (0.011) 0.039 (0.034) 7.525??? (0.948) 3.731??? (1.043) 8.062??? (0.948) 3.725??? (1.012)
1950-1954 0.026?? (0.012) 0.024 (0.035) 5.696??? (0.839) 1.950? (1.047) 6.128??? (0.908) 1.976? (1.078)
1955-1959 0.029??? (0.011) −0.020 (0.033) 2.494??? (0.779) 1.942? (1.004) 3.136??? (0.788) 1.322 (1.026)
1960-1964 0.009 (0.011) −0.013 (0.033) 0.675 (0.805) 1.920? (0.987) 0.878 (0.822) 1.394 (0.975)
1970-1974 0.001 (0.012) −0.038 (0.034) −3.331??? (0.759) −0.417 (0.805) −2.975??? (0.787) −0.946 (0.868)
1975-1979 −0.028?? (0.013) −0.039 (0.035) −3.978??? (0.812) −1.326? (0.777) −4.285??? (0.807) −1.647?? (0.772)
1980-1984 −0.031 (0.023) −0.059 (0.047) −5.033??? (1.159) −0.699 (1.140) −5.321??? (1.160) −1.463 (1.106)
Has kid aged
0 −0.005 (0.015) −0.207 (0.129) 6.621??? (0.879) −2.168 (1.789) 6.007??? (0.881) −2.704? (1.539)
1 −0.008 (0.014) −0.221?? (0.093) 6.790??? (0.784) 4.189 (3.112) 6.131??? (0.754) −0.977 (2.135)
2 0.014 (0.012) −0.123 (0.077) 4.012??? (0.738) −0.118 (2.271) 4.001??? (0.706) −1.786 (1.772)
3 −0.004 (0.011) −0.208??? (0.065) 4.368??? (0.690) 1.548 (2.199) 3.957??? (0.682) −1.733 (1.344)
4 −0.030?? (0.015) −0.073 (0.065) 3.914??? (0.678) −0.875 (1.643) 2.920??? (0.664) −1.523 (1.144)
5 −0.001 (0.010) −0.212??? (0.063) 2.859??? (0.689) 4.267?? (2.151) 2.704??? (0.681) −0.461 (1.385)
6 −0.001 (0.010) −0.206??? (0.065) 2.088??? (0.598) −1.771 (1.498) 2.041??? (0.584) −4.028??? (1.180)
7 0.007 (0.010) −0.063 (0.057) 3.064??? (0.619) 0.474 (1.534) 3.019??? (0.637) −0.783 (1.318)
8 −0.000 (0.008) −0.090? (0.049) 2.691??? (0.587) 4.869?? (1.972) 2.520??? (0.570) 1.773 (1.422)
9 0.001 (0.011) −0.146?? (0.062) 3.672??? (0.736) 0.998 (1.587) 3.416??? (0.752) −1.861 (1.242)
10 0.017?? (0.008) −0.036 (0.053) 1.615??? (0.544) −0.152 (1.289) 1.832??? (0.565) −0.574 (1.112)
Has son aged
11 0.012 (0.011) −0.072 (0.071) 2.799??? (0.836) 2.971 (2.866) 2.974??? (0.854) 0.925 (2.099)
12 −0.009 (0.011) −0.052 (0.061) 1.958??? (0.745) 2.488 (2.260) 1.650?? (0.743) 0.831 (1.725)
13 0.018? (0.009) 0.072 (0.069) 0.414 (0.790) −0.876 (1.395) 0.932 (0.761) 0.490 (1.385)
14 0.023?? (0.009) −0.047 (0.055) 2.142??? (0.691) −0.463 (1.552) 2.738??? (0.723) −0.638 (1.294)
15 0.020?? (0.008) 0.032 (0.047) 0.468 (0.731) 2.174 (1.997) 1.096 (0.721) 1.866 (1.588)
16 −0.017 (0.012) −0.004 (0.049) 3.201??? (0.753) 1.118 (1.200) 2.469??? (0.748) 0.606 (1.117)
17 0.004 (0.011) −0.099?? (0.049) 1.557?? (0.790) −2.853?? (1.338) 1.617?? (0.791) −3.153??? (1.024)
18+ −0.024??? (0.006) −0.221??? (0.029) 1.734??? (0.398) −3.266??? (0.830) 0.953?? (0.392) −5.643??? (0.638)
Has daughter aged
11 0.007 (0.011) −0.093 (0.072) 3.651??? (0.829) −3.109 (1.973) 3.756??? (0.790) −2.805? (1.484)
12 0.011 (0.010) −0.060 (0.081) 0.815 (0.991) −0.018 (2.195) 1.024 (0.973) −0.592 (1.850)
13 0.014 (0.010) −0.076 (0.069) 0.659 (0.867) 2.708 (2.175) 0.962 (0.837) 0.168 (1.866)
14 −0.001 (0.011) −0.132? (0.071) 0.008 (0.751) −4.372??? (1.531) 0.131 (0.750) −4.987??? (1.228)
15 −0.021? (0.011) −0.162?? (0.069) −1.244 (0.800) 0.213 (1.912) −1.639?? (0.754) −2.547? (1.387)
16 −0.026? (0.015) −0.079 (0.066) −0.953 (0.661) −1.603 (1.991) −1.512?? (0.626) −2.300 (1.471)
17 −0.019 (0.012) −0.209??? (0.080) 1.425? (0.779) 2.273 (2.552) 0.812 (0.802) −2.011 (1.908)
18+ 0.004 (0.005) −0.125??? (0.025) 3.627??? (0.370) −1.010 (0.731) 3.541??? (0.384) −2.816??? (0.594)
Constant 0.933??? (0.010) 0.816??? (0.025) 22.758??? (0.751) 14.044??? (0.677) 21.168??? (0.737) 11.488??? (0.679)
Weekly average 0.921 0.742 27.148 14.668 25.009 10.889
Controls for race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort X Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R2 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08
N 18,349 5,765 16,903 4,280 18,349 5,765
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNAD of 2001. Standard errors, clustered by PNAD stratum, in parentheses.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
All models have controls for race and cohort X education interactions.
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Table 6.4: OLS estimates for single people in 2009, by gender
Probability of doing some housework Housework Hours - without zeros Housework Hours - with zeros
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Region
North −0.021?? (0.010) −0.093??? (0.021) −2.295??? (0.668) −0.757 (0.706) −2.699??? (0.690) −1.728??? (0.598)
Northeast −0.011 (0.008) −0.033 (0.029) 2.187??? (0.786) 0.429 (0.564) 1.775??? (0.622) −0.105 (0.496)
South 0.024??? (0.006) 0.091??? (0.016) −2.429??? (0.531) −0.985? (0.518) −1.778??? (0.489) 0.372 (0.433)
Center-West −0.016?? (0.008) −0.024 (0.018) −1.971??? (0.750) −1.258?? (0.639) −2.153??? (0.734) −1.223??? (0.468)
Education
0-3 0.004 (0.019) −0.040 (0.059) −0.110 (1.267) −1.721 (1.076) −0.041 (1.359) −1.955? (1.026)
4-7 0.024 (0.015) −0.018 (0.050) 0.252 (0.922) −1.386 (0.960) 0.907 (0.972) −1.279 (0.977)
11-14 −0.003 (0.012) −0.016 (0.030) −2.019??? (0.651) −1.176 (0.788) −1.943??? (0.629) −1.199 (0.766)
15+ −0.064??? (0.020) −0.086?? (0.040) −5.892??? (0.836) −4.827??? (0.731) −6.639??? (0.867) −4.682??? (0.642)
Cohort
1940-1944 0.023 (0.018) 0.050 (0.040) 8.766??? (1.288) 4.340?? (1.979) 8.952??? (1.268) 4.389?? (1.811)
1945-1949 0.018? (0.010) −0.014 (0.031) 6.490??? (0.766) 1.787? (1.031) 6.585??? (0.790) 1.266 (1.001)
1950-1954 0.016 (0.010) 0.022 (0.027) 5.140??? (0.762) 1.760?? (0.867) 5.271??? (0.775) 1.770?? (0.833)
1955-1959 0.020? (0.011) 0.022 (0.028) 3.873??? (0.617) 2.451??? (0.885) 4.195??? (0.674) 2.376??? (0.816)
1960-1964 0.020?? (0.010) −0.006 (0.028) 1.320? (0.716) 0.027 (0.771) 1.790?? (0.766) −0.064 (0.729)
1970-1974 −0.003 (0.011) −0.016 (0.028) −1.743??? (0.660) −0.378 (0.723) −1.704?? (0.695) −0.523 (0.651)
1975-1979 −0.000 (0.011) −0.050? (0.029) −1.633?? (0.685) −1.429?? (0.666) −1.484?? (0.697) −1.903??? (0.602)
1980-1984 0.014 (0.011) −0.049 (0.033) −3.287??? (0.816) −0.210 (0.868) −2.743??? (0.830) −0.864 (0.791)
1985-1989 −0.012 (0.017) −0.108??? (0.038) −5.485??? (0.856) −2.144?? (0.949) −5.383??? (0.929) −3.164??? (0.791)
Has kid aged
0 −0.024? (0.014) −0.223 (0.136) 6.410??? (0.896) 6.945 (8.132) 5.374??? (0.834) 0.987 (4.725)
1 −0.003 (0.012) −0.226?? (0.105) 5.854??? (0.890) −0.644 (3.386) 5.427??? (0.863) −2.505 (2.071)
2 −0.002 (0.012) −0.058 (0.096) 5.601??? (0.857) 0.694 (2.218) 5.095??? (0.850) −0.039 (1.875)
3 −0.029?? (0.013) −0.122 (0.077) 2.614??? (0.653) 7.118??? (2.616) 1.921??? (0.643) 3.108 (2.058)
4 −0.003 (0.012) −0.218??? (0.081) 3.804??? (0.645) 2.492 (4.087) 3.515??? (0.624) −1.382 (2.421)
5 0.013 (0.009) −0.164?? (0.073) 3.197??? (0.594) 1.215 (2.330) 3.332??? (0.578) −0.842 (1.556)
6 0.002 (0.010) −0.211??? (0.062) 3.555??? (0.584) 4.423?? (1.965) 3.441??? (0.581) −0.295 (1.569)
7 −0.004 (0.010) −0.000 (0.065) 3.039??? (0.580) 1.315 (1.902) 2.758??? (0.593) 1.107 (1.777)
8 −0.001 (0.009) −0.060 (0.062) 1.395??? (0.488) 0.328 (1.212) 1.365??? (0.491) −0.266 (1.114)
9 0.003 (0.009) −0.072 (0.049) 2.377??? (0.523) 0.037 (1.427) 2.328??? (0.546) −0.715 (1.182)
10 0.020??? (0.007) −0.101? (0.057) 3.667??? (0.617) 3.062??? (1.183) 3.918??? (0.625) 0.408 (1.186)
Has son aged
11 0.007 (0.011) −0.067 (0.075) 1.914?? (0.803) 5.216? (2.817) 2.027?? (0.803) 2.780 (2.486)
12 0.013 (0.010) −0.043 (0.050) 1.836??? (0.659) 4.193?? (1.937) 2.060??? (0.676) 2.149 (1.648)
13 0.018? (0.010) 0.001 (0.056) 1.514?? (0.587) 1.266 (1.464) 1.786??? (0.634) 0.810 (1.418)
14 0.019?? (0.009) 0.066 (0.044) 2.318??? (0.637) −0.839 (1.064) 2.737??? (0.666) 0.388 (1.068)
15 0.008 (0.008) 0.054 (0.044) 1.336?? (0.561) 0.401 (1.236) 1.520??? (0.579) 1.217 (1.128)
16 0.005 (0.010) −0.042 (0.055) 1.732??? (0.647) 0.141 (1.096) 1.716??? (0.628) −0.434 (1.082)
17 0.011 (0.011) 0.003 (0.052) 2.320??? (0.695) −0.243 (1.136) 2.462??? (0.681) −0.120 (1.168)
18+ −0.019??? (0.005) −0.213??? (0.025) 1.684??? (0.308) −0.971 (0.816) 1.089??? (0.282) −3.712??? (0.580)
Has daughter aged
11 0.008 (0.011) −0.170?? (0.084) 1.688?? (0.677) 1.510 (1.633) 1.691?? (0.716) −0.994 (1.518)
12 0.011 (0.010) −0.095 (0.068) 1.405?? (0.634) 0.672 (1.689) 1.621?? (0.659) −0.814 (1.450)
13 −0.002 (0.011) −0.001 (0.061) −0.196 (0.640) 0.258 (2.132) −0.164 (0.643) −0.072 (1.762)
14 −0.001 (0.011) −0.104 (0.067) 1.812??? (0.676) 1.372 (2.565) 1.611?? (0.710) −0.801 (2.032)
15 −0.007 (0.010) −0.125? (0.072) −0.582 (0.578) −1.225 (2.346) −0.627 (0.587) −2.393 (1.639)
16 −0.004 (0.011) −0.169?? (0.085) 0.026 (0.608) −0.751 (1.912) −0.108 (0.672) −2.752? (1.554)
17 −0.011 (0.013) −0.115? (0.062) 0.643 (0.615) −0.304 (2.081) 0.240 (0.662) −1.861 (1.610)
18+ −0.001 (0.004) −0.052?? (0.023) 3.139??? (0.268) 1.397?? (0.590) 2.901??? (0.276) 0.241 (0.582)
Constant 0.934??? (0.010) 0.841??? (0.022) 21.455??? (0.529) 13.286??? (0.655) 20.074??? (0.562) 11.201??? (0.552)
Weekly average 0.927 0.787 23.980 13.061 22.236 10.283
Controls for race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort X Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R2 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.04
N 21,825 7,400 20,238 5,826 21,825 7,400
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNAD of 2009. Standard errors, clustered by PNAD stratum, in parentheses. Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
All models have controls for race and cohort X education interactions.
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Table 6.5: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, single people
Females as a reference (Ω = 1) Males as a reference (Ω = 0)
2001 2009 2001 2009
Probability of doing some housework
Different characteristics 0.006 0.002 −0.109 −0.092
Different coefficients on the characteristics 0.051 0.032 0.166 0.126
Different coefficients on the constant term 0.121 0.105 0.121 0.105
Gap 0.179 0.140 0.179 0.140
Housework hours without zeros
Different characteristics 3.813 3.347 0.408 1.420
Different coefficients on the characteristics 0.609 0.236 4.015 2.161
Different coefficients on the constant term 8.058 7.336 8.058 7.336
Gap 12.480 10.919 12.480 10.919
Housework hours with zeros
Different characteristics 3.404 2.993 −1.313 −0.274
Different coefficients on the characteristics 1.863 0.618 6.579 3.883
Different coefficients on the constant term 8.853 8.343 8.853 8.343
Gap 14.119 11.953 14.119 11.953
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
Table 6.6: Smith-Welch decomposition of the probability of doing some housework, single
people
Main Gender Year Year-Gender Total Contribution
Female as reference
Region 0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.004 −0.004
Race 0.000 0.001 0.000 −0.002 −0.001
Education 0.001 −0.004 0.001 0.013 0.011
Cohort −0.001 0.000 0.003 −0.010 −0.008
Children 0-2 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
Children 3-5 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
Children 6-10 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.003
Sons 11 + 0.001 0.003 −0.001 0.001 0.004
Daughters 11 + 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.008
Cohort × Education 0.004 −0.016 −0.005 0.015 −0.001
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.023
Total 0.006 −0.009 −0.002 0.044 0.039
Male as reference
Region 0.001 −0.001 0.000 −0.004 −0.004
Race 0.000 0.001 0.000 −0.002 −0.001
Education 0.001 −0.003 0.002 0.011 0.011
Cohort −0.001 0.000 −0.001 −0.006 −0.008
Children 0-2 −0.003 0.004 −0.001 0.002 0.002
Children 3-5 −0.003 0.005 0.001 −0.001 0.001
Children 6-10 0.000 0.002 −0.003 0.004 0.003
Sons 11 + 0.005 −0.001 −0.003 0.003 0.004
Daughters 11 + −0.001 0.003 −0.013 0.019 0.008
Cohort × Education −0.008 −0.004 0.012 −0.001 −0.001
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.023
Total −0.010 0.007 −0.006 0.048 0.039
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
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Table 6.7: Smith-Welch decomposition, single people
Females as a reference (Ω = 1) Males as a reference (Ω = 0)
Probability of doing some housework
Main effect −0.006 0.010
Gender interaction 0.009 −0.007
Year interaction 0.002 0.006
Year-gender interaction −0.044 −0.048
Total change in the gap −0.039 −0.039
Housework hours without zeros
Main effect −0.603 −0.227
Gender interaction −1.169 −1.545
Year interaction 0.137 1.239
Year-gender interaction 0.073 −1.029
Total change in the gap −1.562 −1.562
Housework hours with zeros
Main effect −0.528 −0.088
Gender interaction −1.460 −1.900
Year interaction 0.117 1.127
Year-gender interaction −0.294 −1.305
Total change in the gap −2.166 −2.166
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
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Table 6.8: OLS estimates for married or cohabiting people in 2001, by gender
Probability of doing some housework Housework Hours - without zeros Housework Hours - with zeros
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Region
North −0.030??? (0.008) −0.054?? (0.022) −4.114??? (0.975) 0.163 (0.612) −4.895??? (0.924) −0.484? (0.284)
Northeast −0.009??? (0.003) −0.077??? (0.016) −0.327 (0.761) 0.270 (0.377) −0.596 (0.755) −0.724??? (0.257)
South 0.009??? (0.003) 0.129??? (0.023) −2.382??? (0.823) 0.778 (0.535) −2.041?? (0.801) 1.834??? (0.465)
Center-West −0.018??? (0.003) −0.011 (0.034) −3.736??? (0.737) −1.229??? (0.267) −4.194??? (0.701) −0.680? (0.358)
Education
0-3 −0.000 (0.006) −0.095??? (0.020) 0.233 (0.865) 0.216 (0.610) 0.161 (0.876) −0.952??? (0.315)
4-7 0.009?? (0.004) −0.044?? (0.019) 1.438?? (0.678) −0.568 (0.412) 1.781??? (0.688) −0.719??? (0.274)
11-14 −0.019??? (0.005) 0.048??? (0.014) −5.043??? (0.517) −0.364 (0.401) −5.517??? (0.504) 0.304 (0.266)
15+ −0.074??? (0.011) 0.094??? (0.023) −15.363??? (0.725) −1.670??? (0.561) −16.678??? (0.736) −0.045 (0.351)
Cohort
1935-1939 −0.006 (0.012) −0.035? (0.019) 5.559??? (1.171) 3.139??? (0.675) 5.189??? (1.296) 1.086??? (0.417)
1940-1944 −0.005 (0.006) −0.019 (0.015) 6.614??? (0.871) 3.014??? (0.435) 6.323??? (0.837) 1.206??? (0.278)
1945-1949 0.001 (0.005) −0.037??? (0.014) 5.819??? (0.787) 1.680??? (0.423) 5.761??? (0.779) 0.360 (0.258)
1950-1954 0.004 (0.004) −0.051??? (0.014) 3.572??? (0.517) 1.396??? (0.399) 3.639??? (0.499) 0.057 (0.258)
1955-1959 0.007?? (0.004) −0.041??? (0.012) 2.318??? (0.566) 0.376 (0.320) 2.554??? (0.556) −0.265 (0.193)
1960-1964 −0.002 (0.003) −0.021? (0.011) 1.012?? (0.478) 0.926??? (0.321) 0.937?? (0.460) 0.206 (0.205)
1970-1974 0.002 (0.003) 0.014 (0.011) −0.826? (0.441) −0.306 (0.262) −0.770? (0.445) −0.022 (0.177)
1975-1979 0.005? (0.003) −0.010 (0.013) −1.466??? (0.460) −0.419 (0.379) −1.285??? (0.463) −0.353 (0.242)
1980-1984 −0.001 (0.005) −0.019 (0.028) −1.569?? (0.681) 0.025 (0.802) −1.600?? (0.676) −0.205 (0.485)
Has kid aged
0 0.000 (0.003) 0.009 (0.010) 7.941??? (0.429) 0.800??? (0.244) 7.756??? (0.415) 0.476??? (0.169)
1 0.003 (0.003) −0.012 (0.009) 6.133??? (0.406) 0.781??? (0.226) 6.128??? (0.412) 0.229 (0.152)
2 0.003 (0.003) −0.011 (0.009) 4.528??? (0.343) 0.494?? (0.209) 4.561??? (0.335) 0.109 (0.125)
3 0.004 (0.003) −0.025??? (0.008) 3.879??? (0.324) 0.519?? (0.247) 3.931??? (0.329) −0.025 (0.141)
4 0.004 (0.003) −0.012 (0.008) 3.267??? (0.343) 0.445?? (0.219) 3.321??? (0.343) 0.079 (0.142)
5 0.004 (0.003) −0.020?? (0.009) 2.548??? (0.332) 0.311 (0.248) 2.635??? (0.334) −0.071 (0.149)
6 −0.002 (0.003) −0.033??? (0.009) 3.123??? (0.311) 0.095 (0.253) 3.021??? (0.317) −0.319?? (0.161)
7 0.001 (0.002) −0.027??? (0.008) 2.637??? (0.351) 0.105 (0.241) 2.603??? (0.354) −0.259? (0.138)
8 0.000 (0.003) −0.012 (0.008) 2.160??? (0.315) −0.500?? (0.240) 2.138??? (0.309) −0.362?? (0.141)
9 0.003 (0.003) −0.007 (0.009) 1.677??? (0.328) 0.295 (0.261) 1.685??? (0.329) 0.036 (0.158)
10 0.004 (0.003) −0.016?? (0.008) 1.825??? (0.311) −0.008 (0.242) 1.927??? (0.321) −0.180 (0.130)
Has son aged
11 −0.002 (0.004) −0.010 (0.012) 1.950??? (0.441) −0.318 (0.279) 1.785??? (0.428) −0.252 (0.182)
12 0.007? (0.004) −0.029??? (0.011) 1.013?? (0.401) 0.203 (0.353) 1.260??? (0.413) −0.248 (0.186)
13 0.003 (0.004) −0.038??? (0.011) 0.501 (0.392) 0.363 (0.311) 0.569 (0.402) −0.273 (0.168)
14 0.006? (0.004) −0.015 (0.010) 1.183?? (0.471) −0.329 (0.279) 1.328??? (0.473) −0.333?? (0.141)
15 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.012) 1.088?? (0.488) −0.289 (0.331) 1.053?? (0.479) −0.124 (0.180)
16 −0.004 (0.004) −0.006 (0.011) 1.026?? (0.452) −0.558? (0.318) 0.865? (0.462) −0.295? (0.175)
17 −0.008? (0.004) −0.020 (0.012) 1.831??? (0.438) −0.108 (0.374) 1.526??? (0.433) −0.265 (0.205)
18+ −0.009??? (0.002) −0.070??? (0.007) 0.608?? (0.279) −0.573?? (0.224) 0.257 (0.270) −1.012??? (0.124)
Has daughter aged
11 0.010??? (0.003) −0.030??? (0.011) 1.199??? (0.448) 0.261 (0.339) 1.493??? (0.449) −0.228 (0.183)
12 0.007?? (0.003) −0.046??? (0.010) 0.533 (0.374) −0.449 (0.278) 0.703? (0.385) −0.670??? (0.141)
13 −0.002 (0.005) −0.042??? (0.010) −0.144 (0.534) −0.276 (0.302) −0.237 (0.545) −0.568??? (0.167)
14 −0.008 (0.005) −0.035??? (0.011) −0.361 (0.456) −0.798??? (0.297) −0.628 (0.482) −0.683??? (0.157)
15 −0.005 (0.004) −0.047??? (0.012) −0.338 (0.429) −0.429 (0.322) −0.461 (0.446) −0.682??? (0.184)
16 −0.015??? (0.005) −0.046??? (0.011) −1.017?? (0.481) −0.447 (0.392) −1.453??? (0.494) −0.664??? (0.200)
17 −0.010? (0.006) −0.057??? (0.011) −1.040?? (0.481) −0.879??? (0.328) −1.282??? (0.482) −0.926??? (0.171)
18+ −0.001 (0.003) −0.044??? (0.006) 2.659??? (0.284) −0.519??? (0.186) 2.528??? (0.286) −0.712??? (0.099)
Constant 0.979??? (0.003) 0.523??? (0.016) 33.941??? (0.536) 10.042??? (0.327) 33.275??? (0.541) 5.314??? (0.239)
Weekly average 0.967 0.466 35.211 10.825 34.100 5.046
Controls for race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort X Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R2 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.02
N 51,413 51,413 49,790 23,964 51,413 51,413
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNAD of 2001. Standard errors, clustered by PNAD stratum, in parentheses.
Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
All models have controls for race and cohort X education interactions.
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Table 6.9: OLS estimates for cohabiting or married people in 2009, by gender
Probability of doing some housework Housework Hours - without zeros Housework Hours - with zeros
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Region
North −0.034??? (0.007) −0.078??? (0.022) −3.165??? (0.797) −0.081 (0.330) −3.942??? (0.786) −0.815??? (0.238)
Northeast −0.014?? (0.006) −0.079??? (0.029) 2.483??? (0.759) 0.405 (0.343) 1.977??? (0.641) −0.593?? (0.245)
South 0.011?? (0.004) 0.119??? (0.018) −2.994??? (0.642) −0.358 (0.279) −2.568??? (0.613) 0.949??? (0.225)
Center-West −0.019??? (0.005) −0.071??? (0.019) −2.583??? (0.885) −0.257 (0.363) −2.930??? (0.805) −0.834??? (0.252)
Education
0-3 0.003 (0.011) −0.050?? (0.025) −0.155 (0.895) 1.353?? (0.638) −0.111 (0.939) 0.088 (0.411)
4-7 0.008 (0.009) −0.047?? (0.022) 0.776 (0.929) −0.941?? (0.443) 0.959 (0.961) −0.897??? (0.303)
11-14 −0.002 (0.006) 0.033??? (0.013) −2.534??? (0.469) 0.482 (0.298) −2.511??? (0.485) 0.607??? (0.193)
15+ −0.064??? (0.010) 0.018 (0.019) −8.471??? (0.591) −1.068??? (0.396) −9.598??? (0.603) −0.407 (0.264)
Cohort
1940-1944 −0.009 (0.028) −0.044 (0.029) 4.113? (2.421) 3.189??? (1.029) 3.578 (2.485) 1.123? (0.669)
1945-1949 −0.013 (0.009) −0.006 (0.015) 8.606??? (0.904) 2.314??? (0.381) 7.709??? (0.951) 1.172??? (0.270)
1950-1954 −0.002 (0.006) −0.018 (0.013) 4.879??? (0.645) 1.578??? (0.382) 4.574??? (0.599) 0.640?? (0.251)
1955-1959 0.009? (0.005) −0.038??? (0.012) 3.467??? (0.489) 1.090??? (0.340) 3.595??? (0.486) 0.161 (0.216)
1960-1964 0.005 (0.005) −0.012 (0.012) 1.679??? (0.434) 0.269 (0.339) 1.727??? (0.428) 0.035 (0.206)
1970-1974 0.004 (0.005) −0.004 (0.011) −1.019?? (0.453) −0.395 (0.317) −0.861? (0.461) −0.246 (0.191)
1975-1979 0.011?? (0.005) 0.020? (0.012) −1.357??? (0.408) −0.277 (0.301) −0.963?? (0.425) 0.046 (0.184)
1980-1984 0.012?? (0.006) 0.011 (0.013) −2.234??? (0.420) −0.617?? (0.279) −1.766??? (0.431) −0.256 (0.185)
1985-1989 0.012?? (0.006) 0.002 (0.017) −3.148??? (0.490) −0.459 (0.350) −2.653??? (0.481) −0.256 (0.252)
Has kid aged
0 0.003 (0.004) 0.020? (0.010) 8.190??? (0.451) 1.336??? (0.221) 7.914??? (0.459) 0.971??? (0.171)
1 0.006 (0.004) −0.013 (0.010) 6.772??? (0.401) 0.872??? (0.260) 6.625??? (0.418) 0.366? (0.187)
2 0.005 (0.004) −0.002 (0.010) 5.372??? (0.396) 0.477?? (0.201) 5.288??? (0.387) 0.268? (0.152)
3 0.009?? (0.004) −0.012 (0.010) 4.390??? (0.416) 0.544?? (0.215) 4.467??? (0.399) 0.178 (0.151)
4 0.009??? (0.003) −0.024??? (0.009) 3.531??? (0.353) 0.224 (0.207) 3.643??? (0.358) −0.111 (0.141)
5 0.002 (0.004) −0.011 (0.009) 3.008??? (0.298) −0.177 (0.205) 2.940??? (0.322) −0.204 (0.149)
6 0.001 (0.003) −0.023?? (0.010) 2.828??? (0.313) 0.149 (0.197) 2.786??? (0.319) −0.151 (0.153)
7 −0.000 (0.003) −0.020?? (0.009) 2.759??? (0.290) 0.283 (0.218) 2.638??? (0.297) −0.070 (0.133)
8 0.005? (0.003) −0.015? (0.009) 2.434??? (0.304) 0.200 (0.220) 2.500??? (0.318) −0.053 (0.138)
9 0.005 (0.003) −0.015? (0.008) 2.430??? (0.286) 0.389?? (0.197) 2.468??? (0.293) 0.056 (0.132)
10 −0.000 (0.004) −0.006 (0.009) 2.155??? (0.304) 0.072 (0.194) 2.042??? (0.312) −0.013 (0.139)
Has son aged
11 −0.001 (0.005) −0.032??? (0.011) 1.061?? (0.417) 0.317 (0.310) 1.000?? (0.416) −0.148 (0.200)
12 −0.006 (0.006) −0.012 (0.012) 1.679??? (0.404) 0.024 (0.270) 1.368??? (0.414) −0.118 (0.202)
13 0.006 (0.004) −0.010 (0.011) 2.226??? (0.434) −0.174 (0.263) 2.331??? (0.438) −0.210 (0.172)
14 0.005 (0.005) 0.001 (0.012) 2.148??? (0.435) 0.139 (0.251) 2.200??? (0.436) 0.061 (0.177)
15 0.002 (0.005) −0.008 (0.012) 0.494 (0.454) 0.070 (0.266) 0.558 (0.454) −0.038 (0.194)
16 0.010?? (0.005) −0.029?? (0.012) 1.566??? (0.458) −0.306 (0.272) 1.774??? (0.467) −0.424?? (0.177)
17 −0.004 (0.007) −0.022? (0.013) 2.205??? (0.446) −0.380 (0.263) 1.997??? (0.445) −0.390?? (0.178)
18+ −0.004 (0.003) −0.055??? (0.007) 1.210??? (0.232) −0.649??? (0.162) 1.035??? (0.239) −0.855??? (0.106)
Has daughter aged
11 0.011?? (0.005) −0.008 (0.011) 1.364??? (0.371) −0.068 (0.275) 1.631??? (0.367) −0.125 (0.185)
12 0.013??? (0.005) −0.016 (0.012) 0.605 (0.421) −0.120 (0.256) 0.949?? (0.436) −0.200 (0.168)
13 0.005 (0.004) −0.022 (0.014) 0.765?? (0.384) 0.062 (0.271) 0.850?? (0.385) −0.156 (0.200)
14 0.001 (0.005) −0.027?? (0.012) 0.945?? (0.470) −0.566?? (0.259) 0.922?? (0.456) −0.571??? (0.168)
15 −0.021??? (0.006) −0.076??? (0.011) 0.930?? (0.471) −0.119 (0.281) 0.260 (0.452) −0.793??? (0.160)
16 0.003 (0.005) −0.047??? (0.011) −0.239 (0.450) −0.411 (0.309) −0.166 (0.468) −0.687??? (0.188)
17 0.004 (0.006) −0.047??? (0.014) −0.249 (0.482) −0.926??? (0.343) −0.041 (0.507) −0.899??? (0.205)
18+ 0.005?? (0.003) −0.018??? (0.006) 2.318??? (0.243) 0.277 (0.174) 2.358??? (0.234) −0.037 (0.101)
Constant 0.959??? (0.005) 0.555??? (0.015) 28.234??? (0.446) 9.499??? (0.320) 27.098??? (0.439) 5.282??? (0.190)
Weekly average 0.953 0.534 29.583 10.021 28.192 5.350
Controls for race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort X Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R2 0.01 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.01
N 54,895 54,895 52,315 29,305 54,895 54,895
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNAD of 2009. Standard errors, clustered by PNAD stratum, in parentheses. Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
All models have controls for race and cohort X education interactions.
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Table 6.10: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, married or cohabiting people
Females as a reference (Ω = 1) Males as a reference (Ω = 0)
2001 2009 2001 2009
Excluding economic power:
Probability of doing some housework
Different characteristics −0.000 −0.001 0.006 0.007
Different coefficient on the characteristics 0.099 0.054 0.093 0.047
Different coefficients on the constant term 0.401 0.366 0.401 0.366
Gap 0.501 0.419 0.501 0.419
Housework hours without zeros
Different characteristics −0.136 −0.435 −0.271 −0.168
Different coefficients on the characteristics 6.830 4.595 6.965 4.327
Different coefficients on the constant term 17.693 15.402 17.693 15.402
Gap 24.386 19.561 24.386 19.561
Housework hours with zeros
Different characteristics −0.704 −0.902 −0.068 −0.048
Different coefficients on the characteristics 8.594 5.556 7.959 4.701
Different coefficients on the constant term 21.164 18.189 21.164 18.189
Gap 29.054 22.842 29.054 22.842
Including economic power:
Probability of doing some housework
Different characteristics 0.017 0.010 0.115 0.087
Different coefficients on the characteristics 0.217 0.161 0.118 0.084
Different coefficients on the constant term 0.267 0.249 0.267 0.249
Gap 0.501 0.419 0.501 0.419
Housework without zeros
Different characteristics 7.384 4.268 3.584 2.096
Different coefficients on the characteristics −3.466 −3.674 0.333 −1.503
Different coefficients on the constant term 20.468 18.968 20.468 18.968
Gap 24.386 19.561 24.386 19.561
Housework with zeros
Different characteristics 7.296 3.948 3.358 2.179
Different coefficients on the characteristics −3.512 −3.286 0.426 −1.517
Different coefficients on the constant term 25.270 22.181 25.270 22.181
Gap 29.054 22.842 29.054 22.842
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
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Table 6.11: Smith-Welch decomposition of the probability of doing some housework (exclud-
ing economic power), cohabiting or married people
Main Gender Year Year-Gender Total Contribution
Female as reference
Region 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.010 −0.012
Race 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.005
Education 0.002 0.016 −0.001 −0.016 0.001
Cohort 0.000 0.004 −0.002 0.009 0.011
Children 0-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Children 3-5 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
Children 6-10 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002
Sons 11 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
Daughters 11 + 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.006
Cohort × Education −0.001 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.011
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.052
Total 0.001 0.027 0.000 0.055 0.082
Male as reference
Region 0.000 −0.001 0.000 −0.010 −0.012
Race 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.005
Education −0.002 0.020 0.002 −0.019 0.001
Cohort 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.011
Children 0-2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Children 3-5 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002
Children 6-10 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.002
Sons 11 + 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002
Daughters 11 + 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.006
Cohort × Education −0.001 −0.001 −0.001 0.014 0.011
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.052
Total −0.002 0.030 0.002 0.053 0.082
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
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Table 6.12: Smith-Welch decomposition, married or cohabiting people
Females as a reference (Ω = 1) Males as a reference (Ω = 0)
Excluding economic power:
Probability of doing some housework
Main effect −0.001 0.002
Gender interaction −0.027 −0.030
Year interaction −0.000 −0.002
Year-gender interaction −0.055 −0.053
Total change in the gap −0.082 −0.082
Housework hours without zeros
Main effect −0.288 0.017
Gender interaction −2.207 −2.512
Year interaction −0.011 0.086
Year-gender interaction −2.319 −2.417
Total change in the gap −4.825 −4.825
Housework hours with zeros
Main effect −0.164 −0.006
Gender interaction −2.868 −3.026
Year interaction −0.034 0.025
Year-gender interaction −3.146 −3.205
Total change in the gap −6.212 −6.212
Including economic power:
Probability of doing some housework
Main effect −0.004 −0.021
Gender interaction −0.036 −0.019
Year interaction −0.002 −0.006
Year-gender interaction −0.039 −0.035
Total change in the gap −0.082 −0.082
Housework hours without zeros
Main effect −1.671 −0.769
Gender interaction −2.381 −3.283
Year interaction −1.446 −0.718
Year-gender interaction 0.672 −0.055
Total change in the gap −4.825 −4.825
Housework hours with zeros
Main effect −1.632 −0.731
Gender interaction −3.043 −3.943
Year interaction −1.717 −0.448
Year-gender interaction 0.179 −1.089
Total change in the gap −6.212 −6.212
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
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Table 6.13: OLS estimates of the percentage of housework (including zeros) performed by
males among cohabiting or married people, by year
Without economic power With economic power
2001 2009 2001 2009
Power −0.162??? (0.015) −0.136??? (0.017)
Power2 −0.013 (0.012) −0.035??? (0.014)
Region
North 0.000 (0.006) −0.007 (0.008) 0.004 (0.005) −0.006 (0.008)
Northeast −0.015??? (0.005) −0.020?? (0.008) −0.014??? (0.005) −0.022??? (0.008)
South 0.044??? (0.007) 0.040??? (0.005) 0.040??? (0.007) 0.036??? (0.005)
Center-West 0.006 (0.012) −0.010? (0.006) 0.003 (0.010) −0.010? (0.005)
Education
0-3 −0.026??? (0.006) −0.013 (0.010) −0.026??? (0.006) −0.021?? (0.010)
4-7 −0.017??? (0.006) −0.029??? (0.008) −0.017??? (0.006) −0.032??? (0.008)
11-14 0.024??? (0.006) 0.019??? (0.005) 0.024??? (0.005) 0.022??? (0.005)
15+ 0.068??? (0.010) 0.018?? (0.008) 0.063??? (0.010) 0.023??? (0.007)
Cohort
1935-1939 −0.010 (0.008) − − −0.013? (0.008) − −
1940-1944 −0.000 (0.006) −0.016 (0.013) −0.002 (0.006) −0.013 (0.013)
1945-1949 −0.013?? (0.005) −0.003 (0.007) −0.012?? (0.005) −0.006 (0.007)
1950-1954 −0.011?? (0.005) −0.009 (0.006) −0.010?? (0.005) −0.011? (0.006)
1955-1959 −0.011??? (0.004) −0.014??? (0.005) −0.009?? (0.004) −0.015??? (0.005)
1960-1964 −0.001 (0.004) −0.006 (0.005) 0.001 (0.004) −0.008 (0.005)
1970-1974 0.002 (0.004) −0.005 (0.005) 0.000 (0.003) −0.006 (0.005)
1975-1979 −0.000 (0.005) 0.003 (0.005) −0.001 (0.005) −0.001 (0.005)
1980-1984 −0.006 (0.010) 0.004 (0.005) −0.005 (0.010) −0.002 (0.005)
1985-1989 − − 0.005 (0.007) − − 0.003 (0.007)
Has kid aged
0 −0.013??? (0.003) −0.015??? (0.004) 0.001 (0.003) −0.003 (0.004)
1 −0.018??? (0.003) −0.026??? (0.005) −0.005 (0.003) −0.014??? (0.004)
2 −0.015??? (0.003) −0.019??? (0.004) −0.005? (0.003) −0.011??? (0.004)
3 −0.016??? (0.003) −0.019??? (0.004) −0.009??? (0.003) −0.013??? (0.004)
4 −0.013??? (0.003) −0.022??? (0.004) −0.006?? (0.003) −0.019??? (0.003)
5 −0.011??? (0.003) −0.017??? (0.004) −0.006?? (0.003) −0.014??? (0.003)
6 −0.015??? (0.003) −0.017??? (0.004) −0.010??? (0.003) −0.015??? (0.004)
7 −0.015??? (0.003) −0.013??? (0.004) −0.012??? (0.003) −0.012??? (0.003)
8 −0.014??? (0.003) −0.013??? (0.003) −0.011??? (0.003) −0.012??? (0.003)
9 −0.007?? (0.003) −0.008?? (0.003) −0.007?? (0.003) −0.009??? (0.003)
10 −0.010??? (0.003) −0.011??? (0.003) −0.009??? (0.003) −0.012??? (0.003)
Has son aged
11 −0.009?? (0.004) −0.012?? (0.005) −0.009?? (0.004) −0.012?? (0.005)
12 −0.011??? (0.004) −0.009? (0.005) −0.012??? (0.004) −0.009? (0.005)
13 −0.011??? (0.004) −0.014??? (0.005) −0.013??? (0.004) −0.014??? (0.004)
14 −0.012??? (0.003) −0.007 (0.005) −0.014??? (0.003) −0.009?? (0.004)
15 −0.001 (0.004) −0.005 (0.006) −0.005 (0.004) −0.008 (0.005)
16 −0.007? (0.004) −0.018??? (0.005) −0.014??? (0.004) −0.024??? (0.005)
17 −0.011?? (0.004) −0.015??? (0.005) −0.019??? (0.004) −0.021??? (0.005)
18+ −0.022??? (0.003) −0.025??? (0.003) −0.039??? (0.003) −0.044??? (0.003)
Has daughter aged
11 −0.012??? (0.003) −0.012??? (0.005) −0.013??? (0.003) −0.012?? (0.005)
12 −0.019??? (0.003) −0.016??? (0.004) −0.019??? (0.003) −0.018??? (0.004)
13 −0.011?? (0.005) −0.012?? (0.005) −0.014??? (0.004) −0.015??? (0.005)
14 −0.010?? (0.005) −0.016??? (0.005) −0.012??? (0.004) −0.015??? (0.005)
15 −0.015??? (0.004) −0.023??? (0.005) −0.017??? (0.004) −0.025??? (0.005)
16 −0.010?? (0.004) −0.016??? (0.006) −0.014??? (0.004) −0.020??? (0.005)
17 −0.022??? (0.004) −0.026??? (0.005) −0.027??? (0.004) −0.030??? (0.005)
18+ −0.024??? (0.002) −0.014??? (0.003) −0.049??? (0.002) −0.041??? (0.003)
Constant 0.143??? (0.005) 0.171??? (0.005) 0.269??? (0.007) 0.287??? (0.007)
Weekly average 0.129 0.161 0.129 0.161
Controls for race Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort X Education interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj-R2 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.08
N 50,076 53,052 50,076 53,052
Source: Author’s estimation using the 2001 and 2009 PNADs. Standard errors,
clustered by PNAD stratum, in parentheses. Significance levels: ? = 0.10, ?? = 0.05, ? ? ? = 0.01.
All models have controls for race and cohort X education interactions.
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Table 6.14: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the percentage of housework (including zeros)
performed by males among cohabiting or married people
Without economic power With economic power
2001 as reference 2009 as reference 2001 as reference 2009 as reference
Different characteristics 0.014 0.010 0.023 0.018
Different coefficients on the characteristics −0.007 −0.004 −0.002 −0.005
Different coefficients on the constant term 0.026 0.026 0.013 0.013
Gap 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
Table 6.15: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by regions, married or cohabiting people
North Northeast Southeast South Midwest Bottom 20% Top 20%
Female as reference:
2001
Different characteristics −0.560 −0.800 −0.706 −0.472 −1.005 −0.210 −1.143
Different coefficients on the characteristics 1.537 3.238 4.534 2.917 4.292 8.422 4.440
Different coefficients on the constant term 25.882 28.674 26.505 24.093 23.313 25.688 19.620
Gap 26.859 31.111 30.333 26.538 26.599 33.901 22.916
2009
Different characteristics −0.531 −0.953 −0.915 −0.920 −0.954 −0.417 −1.446
Different coefficients on the characteristics 1.289 2.372 2.033 2.084 5.176 7.018 1.491
Different coefficients on the constant term 19.978 24.858 22.027 18.340 16.700 21.939 17.978
Gap 20.738 26.277 23.147 19.503 20.922 28.538 18.022
Male as reference:
2001
Different characteristics −0.094 0.007 −0.064 −0.153 −0.103 0.003 −0.095
Different coefficients on the characteristics 1.071 2.430 3.891 2.598 3.389 8.208 3.391
Different coefficients on the constant term 25.882 28.674 26.505 24.093 23.313 25.688 19.620
Gap 26.859 31.111 30.333 26.538 26.599 33.901 22.916
2009
Different characteristics −0.060 −0.029 −0.060 −0.096 0.004 −0.060 −0.161
Different coefficients on the characteristics 0.818 1.448 1.179 1.260 4.218 6.660 0.206
Different coefficients on the constant term 19.978 24.858 22.027 18.340 16.700 21.939 17.978
Gap 20.738 26.277 23.147 19.503 20.922 28.538 18.022
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
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Table 6.16: Smith-Welch decomposition by regions, married or cohabiting people
Females as a reference (Ω = 1) Males as a reference (Ω = 0)
Regions
North
Main effect −0.133 0.015
Gender interaction −2.401 −2.549
Year interaction 0.162 0.020
Year-gender interaction −3.748 −3.607
Total change in the gap −6.121 −6.121
Northeast
Main effect −0.129 −0.002
Gender interaction −3.006 −3.133
Year interaction −0.024 −0.034
Year-gender interaction −1.676 −1.665
Total change in the gap −4.834 −4.834
Southeast
Main effect −0.174 0.034
Gender interaction −3.249 −3.457
Year interaction −0.035 −0.030
Year-gender interaction −3.728 −3.734
Total change in the gap −7.186 −7.186
South
Main effect −0.305 −0.010
Gender interaction −2.715 −3.009
Year interaction −0.143 0.067
Year-gender interaction −3.873 −4.083
Total change in the gap −7.035 −7.035
Midwest
Main effect −0.072 0.067
Gender interaction −2.847 −2.986
Year interaction 0.123 0.039
Year-gender interaction −2.881 −2.797
Total change in the gap −5.677 −5.677
Family income
Bottom 20%
Main effect −0.009 0.061
Gender interaction −1.683 −1.754
Year interaction −0.198 −0.125
Year-gender interaction −3.473 −3.546
Total change in the gap −5.363 −5.363
Top 20%
Main effect −0.432 0.054
Gender interaction −3.808 −4.293
Year interaction 0.128 −0.120
Year-gender interaction −0.783 −0.534
Total change in the gap −4.894 −4.894
Source: Author’s estimation using the PNADs from 2001 and 2009.
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